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ABSTRACT 
 This project incorporates three different examinations of the relationship between charter 
schools and public school districts and district-run public schools. Charter schools, publically 
funded and privately run, are thought to improve performance in district-run public schools 
through a variety of forces. This project focuses on the competitive pressure, or the threat of 
competitive pressure, generated by charter schools and charter school policies and how those 
pressures do, and do not, impact district-run public schools. The first paper, a literature review of 
how charter schools induce competition in district-run public schools, examines quantitative and 
qualitative analyses of how charter schools may or may not compel public school districts to 
respond. The second paper uses longitudinal district-level data to examine the relationship 
between Ohio charter school policy and changes in public school district instructional resource 
allocation. The third paper is an examination of how, in the quantitative literature, competition is 
measured in examinations of the second-level effects of charter schools, and a critique 
of existing approaches to that measurement. The findings from this project highlight the various 
potential influences that may induce or mitigate a response from a public school district. One 
such influence is charter school policy itself, and this study demonstrates that some Ohio charter 
school policies may be associated with increased level of instructional resource allocation. These 
findings are problematized by inconsistent findings in other, similar charter school policies and 
methodological concerns; further, other studies of charter school competition are problematized 
by inconsistent definitions and metrics of competition.   
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PAPER 1  
HOW CHARTER SCHOOLS DO, AND DON’T, INSPIRE CHANGE IN TRADITIONAL 
PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
 In 1991, the state of Minnesota succeeded in proposing and passing the first charter 
school legislation in the United States. Soon after, in 1992, California passed its own charter 
school legislation. Now, charter school legislation has passed in over 40 states and has enjoyed 
bi-partisan support from conservatives and liberals, and from some teachers unions and 
entrepreneurs (Lubienski & Weitzel, 2010). Throughout the United States, school districts, non-
for-profits, universities, and other organizations have sponsored charter schools in urban, 
suburban, and rural communities. One result of this proliferation is an increase in the competitive 
pressures that district-run public schools face. 
 Considering the growing numbers of charter schools and the continued effort to expand 
charter school legislation (Fact Sheet: Race to the Top, 2009), it is important for teachers, school 
leaders, teacher educators, students, families, and policymakers to understand the impact of 
charter schools. The wide-ranging and multi-faceted effects of charter school competition on 
district-run public schools have been studied in a variety of ways. Such studies have shown that 
the climate of the school, the nature of district leadership, and the motivation of teachers are 
directly related to a district’s ability to respond to competitive pressure (Hess, 2001; Hess , 
Maranto, & Merriman, 2001a). Understanding what aspects of this competition provoke 
responses and what those responses bring can be of great benefit to those working in and leading 
district-run public schools and charter schools alike. If charter schools are to be viewed as an 
opportunity to improve student learning, rather than an obstacle to be overcome, teachers and 
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school leaders should be aware of why and how districts typically respond to charter school 
competition. 
 Charter schools, like district-run public schools, receive public funding. Unlike district-
run public schools, however, charter schools operate outside the traditional public education 
system and so are able to avoid much of the bureaucracy of the traditional system. In exchange 
for this freedom, charter schools are held to high accountability standards. Charter schools also 
typically circumvent traditional geographic school districts by opening themselves to students 
from across district boundaries; students who leave the district-run public school bring their 
public funding with them. Therefore, if a charter school fails to attract or retain students, it loses 
its funding and is forced to close. At the same time, district-run public schools are forced to 
compete with the charter schools for local students. In other words, both charter schools and 
district-run public schools are striving to attract the same students and families. This competition 
between the charter school and the district-run public school, many believe, will result in 
increased efficiency and effectiveness in both institutions (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Freidman, 1955; 
Hoxby, 2000). 
 For some, charter schools represent the hope of improved student learning and 
performance. One way charter schools can improve student learning is by leveraging competitive 
pressure to improve the performance of district-run public schools. Unfortunately, studies 
examining whether increased charter school competition has improved achievement at district-
run public schools show mixed results. Some studies found small, positive results for charter 
school competition (Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg, & Jansen, 2008; Sass, 2006), and some studies 
found no effects (Bettinger, 2005; Bifulco & Ladd, 2006). 
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 Ideally, the introduction of a charter school, and the resulting increase in competitive 
forces in the local education market, may compel a public school district to respond to the 
potential loss of funding in terms of per-pupil dollars, or the loss of human capital—as the higher 
SES and more likely to be successful students are motivated to exit the district-run system. This 
response has been seen in New Zealand (Fiske & Ladd, 2000). Yet public school districts may 
respond to this perceived threat in a variety of ways. The type and strength of the competitive 
pressures may determine how, or if, the district responds. The assertions of those promoting 
choice as a method of improving performance and efficiency seem to expect uniform responses 
from schools based on non-uniform influences in varying contexts. Consequently, it becomes 
crucial to understand the factors generated by the emerging charter school sector that can lead to 
different types of changes in public schools. In particular, we hope to understand the theory of 
change underlying charter schools relative to the actual evidence on their impact. 
 In order to address this issue, we examine the logic of organizational change and 
competitive options, drawing on evidence about the competitive effects of charter schools. First, 
this paper explores external factors that may induce or mitigate the pressure of a public school 
district to respond to competition from charter schools; these factors include the market share of 
charter schools, the degree of loss to these competing schools, the size of the student population, 
or the quality of the competing schools. Analyzing existing research that identifies these factors 
and how they relate to the response of the public school district demonstrates how and if external 
pressures mitigate or induce a competitive response from the traditional school district. Next, we 
focus on how internal factors relate to the ways in which a public school district might respond 
to competitive pressure. Such factors include the knowledge, attitude, and beliefs of the district 
leadership and the organizational behavior of the public school district.  
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How Might Outside Forces Affect Public School Districts’ Responses to Charter School 
Competition? 
According to economic theorists, competition should make schools more efficient by 
pressuring them to perform at a level that was not previously attained in the organization 
(Friedman, 1955). The pressure of this competition should prompt the district to become more 
efficient and therefore more appealing to families. However, this is not always the case. There 
are three key findings in any study of non-charter public schools’ response to competition: 1) 
school districts systematically respond to competition in some measurable or observable way, 
such as shifting financial resources from one area to another; 2) because districts respond to 
competitive situations in different ways, there is no systematic response pattern; and 3) most 
schools do not respond to competition and therefore any response is difficult, if not impossible, 
to measure using traditional methods (Arsen & Ni, 2012). Economists have developed a variety 
of models for studying strategic behavior under competitive pressure, but little of this type of 
study has been applied to school systems (Hoxby, 2003; Ni & Arsen, 2010); the studies that have 
been conducted, largely interviews and case studies (e.g., Hess, 2002; Teske, Schneider, 
Buckley, & Clark, 2001), show mixed results. 
 Ni and Arsen (2010) outline how a charter school can create a change in behavior at the 
public school district level and what that change might entail. First, charter schools must exert 
enough competitive pressure so that public school district administrators notice a change in 
enrollment. Some point to 6% student attrition to the charter schools as the threshold for igniting 
a district response (Hoxby, 2003). However, there are multiple methods for measuring strength 
of competition, including proximity of charter schools, number of charter schools, or type of 
charter school policy (Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg, & Jansen, 2008). Next, the administrator 
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must understand and interpret the competitive pressures. Finally, the administrator must decide 
that the increased competitive pressure warrants a response, of which there are three options: 
accommodate the charter school by passively responding or working with the charter school; 
compete with the charter school by improving academic quality, differentiating services, or 
employing marketing strategies; or create barriers for the charter school through political actions 
or by restricting access to networks, such as extracurricular organizations. Considering the 
financial and administrative limitations facing the public school district, some of the most 
common responses include: changing school or district leadership, creating new curricular 
programs (such as Montessori or a gifted program), expanding instructional time (such as 
instituting all-day kindergarten or lengthening the school day), offering child care, adding 
extracurricular activities, or using marketing strategies to try to entice new student enrollment 
(Ni & Arsen, 2010).  
 The type of charter school also can affect the level of competitive pressure. A conversion 
charter, which is a public school that has been converted into a charter school, likely will be 
more dependent on public funds than mission or market charters, which are typically start-ups 
and rely more on private funding (Huerta & d’Entremont, 2010). Conversion charters tend to 
more closely resemble district-run public schools or be run by the public school district itself, 
while mission or market charters are run by external organization and rely less on public funds. 
Therefore, the type of charter school can affect whether and how a public school district 
responds to the generated competition, as schools with the same bureaucratic restraints as public 
school districts may not be able to exert the same competitive pressure.  
 As charter school reforms grow in popularity, the consequent impact has received 
increasing levels of attention from scholars and policymakers. Ericson, Silverman, Berman, 
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Nelson, and Solomon (2001) found that state and local conditions, external factors outside the 
public school district, affected the way district leaders perceived charter school impact; namely, 
states with similarly constructed charter laws tend to have similar perceived impacts by district 
leaders. This finding indicates that the way charter laws are constructed can influence how and if 
school districts respond. Also, the charter authorizing agency was found to affect district leaders’ 
perceptions of the charter school; when the school district authorized the charter school, as 
opposed to an outside agency, the district was much less likely to perceive the charter school as a 
threat. If outside authorizers were coupled with declining enrollments, district leaders were much 
more likely to perceive the charter school as a challenge and respond with market-oriented 
strategies. Smaller districts also were more likely to perceive the charter school as a threat, as 
even a small number of exiting students had a profound effect on the district budget. Public 
school districts that perceived the charter school as a challenge, rather than an opportunity, were 
more likely to respond with administrative or market-oriented strategies (Ericson et al., 2001). 
Other studies have examined how school choice policies affect the impact of charter schools.   
 Given the finite financial resources available to a public school district to utilize in a 
response to increasing competition, Arsen and Ni (2012) assert that measuring changes in 
resource allocation is a way to determine how and if public school districts are responding to 
increasing competitive pressures from charter schools. Economic theory states that the increasing 
levels of competition should lead to improved efficiency in the district-run system. Conventional 
wisdom then indicates that public school districts, when exposed to increased competition, 
should transfer funds from support services (operations, maintenance, administration, and 
business) into instructional programs (Arsen & Ni, 2012). Logically, instruction is the 
expenditure most directly linked to student achievement and increased investment in 
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instructional programs should lead to increased achievement and efficiency. By measuring both 
the magnitude and duration of competition, these researchers attempt to identify school districts 
most affected by competitive pressure and measure whether schools that have been exposed at 
different levels for different lengths of time respond differently to the competitive pressures 
exerted by the charter school. They found that, contrary to conventional wisdom, public school 
districts do not increase their investments in instructional programs. In fact, school districts that 
have been exposed to charter school competition for a short or medium period of time do not 
alter resource allocation behaviors at all (Arsen & Ni, 2012). While those public school districts 
exposed to significant competition for a long period do shift resources, they tend to shift those 
resources away from instructional programs and into business and administration expenditures 
(Arsen & Ni, 2012). These findings support those of other scholars, who found, using more 
qualitative methods, that increased exposure to competitive pressures induce public school 
districts to invest in marketing strategies (Lubienski, 2005). However, this more recent evidence 
elaborates on prior research with the discovery that these investments are made at the cost of 
instructional programs. This finding is of specific concern to those focused on student learning 
and instructional spending. 
 While increasing duration and magnitude of charter school competition is likely to induce 
a response from the public school district, many external factors may mitigate a response and 
lighten the pressure. Teske et al. (2001) discuss the factors that might lessen a possible response. 
For example, many charter schools are located in or near metro areas with large numbers of 
students; therefore, even if a significant number of students choose to exit the public school 
district in favor of the charter school, the effects may be dispersed enough throughout the entire 
area that it does not pose a threat to the public school district. Some districts may welcome the 
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exit of vocal, disaffected families. Also, if the population of school-age children is growing, 
public school district enrollment may remain level even if families are choosing the charter 
school. While the characteristics of public school district leadership may mitigate a response 
when leadership is unsure or unwilling to respond, leaders who are particularly entrepreneurial 
and looking to take advantage of the increased competition or innovations produced by the 
charter school may be more likely to respond—although even leaders may be further hindered by 
the inability of charter schools to disseminate said innovations (Teske et al., 2001). 
 Smaller districts may be more exposed to the competitive pressure of charter schools than 
larger districts. In an effort to study this, Hess, Maranto, and Milliman (2001b) looked at four 
small Arizona school districts that had experienced significant enrollment losses, ranging from 
10-33%. Smaller districts facing intense and extended competitive pressure were more likely to 
respond than districts not exposed to the same competitive pressures. Even given this somewhat 
similar context (the same state with the same laws), district responses were not uniform. The 
responses depended on such external factors as the size of the student population, the changes in 
the educational market place, and the quality of the charter school. In one school district, the 
opening of the charter school resulted in leadership changes at the public school district; another 
school invested in community outreach and inter-district communication; and one district began 
making moves towards assimilating the charter school. It was clear that certain factors led to 
certain responses; for example, the public school district that minimally responded was not 
threatened by the charter school due to the poor quality of the charter, while the public school 
district that changed leadership did so based on parental preferences about education (Hess et al., 
2001b).  
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 In one of the first studies done on public school district responses to charter schools, 
Rofes (1998) noted that change always occurs after a charter opens, but that the change is never 
predictable. He notes that several factors can induce a response: the overall ecology of choice, 
student performance, media attention, charter policies and laws, enrollment levels, and district 
leadership. Clearly, despite the variety in responses, public school districts do not respond 
randomly to increasing competitive pressure. Given accountability and legal restrictions, as well 
as a finite amount of financial resources, options are limited.  
 Based on the discussion above, it is clear that certain external factors can affect if and 
how a public school district responds to charter school competition. The size of the district can 
affect the response; smaller districts, possibly due to economies of scale, feel competitive 
pressures more sharply. Local policies and state laws also relate to how public school districts 
experience competition; because of this, the study of charter school effects is highly 
contextualized. The duration and magnitude of charter school pressure also can provoke a 
response from the public school district; as districts feel more pressure for a longer period of 
time, they become more likely to respond. The response of a particular public school district can 
be difficult to predict, but long-term pressure was related, in one case, to shifting resources away 
from instructional programs and toward business and administration expenses. 
 
What Internal Forces Affect How and If Public School Districts Respond to Charter School 
Competition? 
As stated above, many factors can affect how and if a school district responds to an 
increase in competition, and many of those factors are controlled by forces outside of the public 
school district. Some organizational and leadership behaviors from within the school district also 
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can affect how the school district responds; however, the district leadership must recognize, 
interpret, and actually respond to competition in order for a researcher to make such an 
observation. 
 Clearly, the organizational structure of public school districts can influence a potential 
response. However, the employees of the public school district ultimately determine how and if 
the response occurs. Public school district leadership and teachers employed by the district have 
the most direct interaction with students and ultimately must be the ones to recognize, interpret, 
and react to competitive pressures. Hess (2001) argues that because teachers enjoy no additional 
benefit from attracting additional students, unless they feel their employment is threatened, the 
competitive pressure of charter schools is diffused throughout the faculty, thereby lessening the 
pressure on the entire system. Metaphorically, he likens the competitive effects of charter 
schools to a pickaxe rather than a bulldozer. This assertion is supported by Arsen and Ni ’s 
(2012) finding that resource allocation changes occurred only after a long-term exposure to 
competition. Hess argues that, in addition to the extent of the external threat, the results of 
competition will be shaped by three internal elements: the sensitivity of administrators to market 
pressures, the incentives and sanctions the administrators can utilize to improve performance of 
educators, and the temperament and skills of educators (Hess, 2001). Further examinations of 
these issues by Hess, Maranto, and Milliman (2001a) support that argument. They found that 
schools with uncooperative cultures had no significant changes based on charter competition. In 
schools with cooperative cultures, however, charter competition spurred changes in the behavior 
of district leadership. This would indicate that while the leadership must recognize, interpret, and 
respond to the increasing charter competition, the culture of the entire school may mitigate 
possible responses. 
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Conclusion 
By studying the external and internal factors that lead to if and how a public school 
district responds to increasing levels of charter school competition, it becomes clear what such a 
response might entail. This is significant because it speaks to the limited potential of the change 
to be achieved from the competitive effects of charter schools—to predict and explain the types 
of responses actually embraced by district-run schools. It suggests that charter schools, while 
they may have many advantages for the students who choose to enroll in them, are limited in the 
impact they may have on other public schools, particularly in shaping the types of improvement 
policymakers hope to see at the classroom level. While students enrolled in charter schools 
remain a minority of the student population as a whole, understanding how a charter school 
relates to student learning also involves understanding how charter schools affect district-run 
public schools.  
 Even a cursory look of the existing literature calls attention to the need for future research 
on the relationship between charter schools and public school districts. The factors that lead to a 
certain response in one arena may lead to a completely different response in another arena. 
Certain external and internal factors are certainly related to an increase in the likelihood of a 
response, such as: the magnitude and duration of the competitive pressure, the local and state 
policies, the climate of the public school district, and the ability and desire of the public school 
district leadership to respond to competitive pressures. Studies, such as those discussed here, 
have had small and mixed findings, leading most to refrain from drawing definitive conclusions. 
Perhaps the most significant lesson learned from this review is that further research utilizing 
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rigorous quantitative and qualitative methods is needed to examine these problems and 
contribute to the culmination of knowledge in this important field. 
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PAPER 2 
EXAMINING CHARTER SCHOOL POLICY AND PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN OHIO 
In the United States, educational reform policies have continued to blur the distinction 
between public and private schooling by introducing a variety of market-based educational 
reforms such as charter schools, private school vouchers, open-enrollment schemes, and tuition 
tax credits. Advocates of choice-based reforms claim that such policies, in addition to offering 
alternative options, will improve the performance and efficiency of district-run public schools by 
exposing them to competitive pressure (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Friedman, 1955). Competition 
from charter schools is expected to open additional educational options for students and families 
and, through competitive effects, improve the of efficiency district-run public schoolsi. However, 
district leaders are sensitive to various inputs, and the threat of competition, inherent in charter 
school policies, may alone be sufficient to drive change in school district efficiency.    
Much of the research on charter schools has focused on comparing charter schools to 
district-run public schools. Research into the effects of charter schools on district-run public 
schools, has returned mixed results (Arsen & Ni, 2012; Bettinger, 2005; Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; 
Booker et al., 2008; Hoxby, 2003; Sass, 2006). While these studies speak to the effect of charter 
school competition, they do not directly measure the effect of the threat of competition inherent 
in charter school policies. Despite these mixed results, and lack of focus by researchers on the 
policy threat, charter school policies continue to grow and are the fastest growing reform in the 
United States (Teske et al., 2001; National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2012). State 
policy makers have very little control over the day-to-day operations of a charter school, how 
that charter school is perceived by the district-run public school, or whether the charter school 
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will drive efficiency improvements; but, policy makers do have control over the types of policies 
implemented in their state.  
While charter schools still only occupy a small share of the educational market in the 
United States, policy makers and educational reformers are embracing this movement. Given the 
recent expansion of charter schools and proliferation of charter school policies, many 
communities that do not currently have charter schools could soon. Very little is known about the 
effects of charter school policy on district-run public schools, and understanding how existing 
publicly-run school districts may respond to these policies is important. Policies generating 
competition in public education, such as charter school policies, have been sold to the public as a 
rising “tide that lifts all boats” (Hoxby, 2003, p. 1), but evidence to support these claims are 
lacking, conflicted, or highly contextualized (Arsen & Ni, 2012; Bettinger, 2005; Bifulco & 
Ladd, 2006; Booker et al., 2008; Hoxby, 2003; Ni & Arsen, 2010; Sass, 2006). Additionally, 
these studies examine the effects of charter school competition, though do not directly examine 
the impact of charter school policy, which generates the threat of competition.   
The vast majority of students still attend district-run schools. Even in Ohio, the subject of 
this study and a state with multiple choice programs, 79.80% of students attend district-run 
public schools and only 4.49% of students attend charter schools [see figure 1], which are known 
as “Community Schools.” This stresses the priority of understanding the effects of these policies 
on district-run public schools. There has long been pressure for public districts and schools to be 
more efficient, but in recent years that pressure has been building as state and local budgets 
diminish. This study proposes to examine the assertion that increasing competition for public 
school districts will lead to greater efficiency in said districts by examining an aspect of 
efficiency and an aspect of competition: resource allocation and charter school policies. 
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Resource Allocation and Policies as a Proxy for Efficiency  
If we accept the contention, as made famous by Friedman (1955), that increasing 
competition in the educational marketplace leads to greater efficiency, then the expected changes 
in efficiency should generate from the central district office where most resource allocation 
decisions are made. However, there is a finite amount of resources available to public school 
districts, typically determined through a combination of local, state, and federal contributions. 
These resources can be divided into different expenditure types including personnel, instruction, 
activities, infrastructure, transportation, and food service (Thompson, Wood, & Crampton, 
2008).  
The finite level of resources and the needs of the district constrain a district’s ability to 
become more efficient. In order to become more efficient, districts may focus on increasing 
achievement, and restrict themselves to spending money in areas that are most connected to 
student performance, namely instruction (Arsen & Ni, 2012). There is a growing literature that 
relies on the assertion that instructional expenditures are more productive, in terms of 
contribution to student achievement, than administrative expenditures. As such, an increase in 
the proportion of a budget directed towards instruction can be interpreted as an attempted 
increase in efficiency (Arsen & Ni, 2012; Chakrabarti & Roy, 2012). Arsen and Ni (2012) 
examined the role of charter penetration — the market share of students that attend charter 
schools within a district — in public school district resource allocation. They found that though 
there were no immediate effects, public school districts exposed to high levels of competition for 
long periods of time shifted resources away from instruction and into administrative 
expenditures. These findings indicate that high levels of competition, resulted in decreased 
efficiency — a finding that contradicts economic theory (Friedman, 1955). Whereas, Chakrabarti 
 19 
 
and Roy (2012) found that Michigan’s Proposal A, a 1994 policy that centralized Michigan 
educational spending, resulted in decreased instructional expenditures. As local budgetary 
control is viewed as a generator of Tiebout competition in which residents seek out their 
preferred tax-service package, Proposal A can be viewed as a policy that decreased competition 
in Michigan. While Arsen and Ni (2012) found that increased competition led to decreased 
instructional expenditures, Chakrabarti and Roy (2012) found that decreased competition also led 
to decreased instructional expenditures. This indicates that competition, as measured by the 
activation of Policy A or charter school penetration, resulted in conflicting findings when using 
instructional resource expenditures as a proxy for efficiency. Inasmuch as these studies 
demonstrate the nuanced relationship between competition and efficiency, both studies take 
place in Michigan, a unique context with a unique combination of policies impacting competition 
between schools (Aresen & Ni, 2011; Chakrabarti & Roy, 2012).  
Studies using resource allocation as a proxy for district efficiency have found conflicting 
evidence of competition’s effect on efficiency (Arsen & Ni, 2012; Chakrabarti & Roy, 2012). 
However, the use of resource allocation as a proxy for school district efficiency and the use of 
state policy as a proxy for competition (Chakrabarti & Roy, 2012) establish a useful theoretical 
framework for the study of competition and efficiency through the use of charter school policy 
and public school district resource allocation. Incorporating these most recent studies into the 
economic theory of competition as a driving force for improved efficiency (Chubb & Moe, 1990; 
Friedman, 1955), a district responding to potential or actual charter school competition by 
attempting to become more efficient may shift resource allocation out of non-instructional 
expenditures and into instructional expenditures. Districts are expected to improve efficiency in 
order to retain parents, who, when given a choice, are expected to choose the most academically 
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effective school for their children (Alexander, 2012). Following this framework, this study tests 
whether charter policies impact resource allocation changes at public school districts, and 
answers the following research question: what are the size and direction of the changes in public 
school district instructional resource allocation associated with changes in state charter school 
policy? This study contributes to the literature in that, unlike previously executed studies, it 
examines the threat of competition generated by charter school policies, further examines 
instructional resource allocation as a proxy for efficiency, and expands such an examination 
beyond Michigan. 
Research Context and Data Sources 
The expansion of charter schools throughout the country provides different opportunities 
to support research of charter schools as a market-based reform, but the educational and 
legislative context in Ohio is particularly well-suited for this research. Ohio has instituted 
multiple market-based reforms including charter schools and vouchers ii. In addition, charter 
school legislation has existed in Ohio for over 15 years. While this context is exciting for 
examining outcomes associated with charter school policies, this study only examines changes 
immediately following charter school policies, rather than examining changes over time, as I rely 
on the exogenous shock of policy activation to examine the changes in resource allocation 
associated with the policies. 
Research Context 
In 1997, Ohio passed Senate Bill 55 (SB55) which permitted conversion charter schools 
throughout the state, but only permitted start-ups in Lucas County and the ‘urban eight’iii city 
districts. In 1999, Ohio passed House Bill 282 (HB282), a similar bill that impacted an additional 
13 districts: Cleveland Heights, East Cleveland, Elyria, Euclid, Hamilton, Lima, Lorain, 
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Mansfield, Middletown, Parma, South-Western, Springfield, and Warren (“Legislation for 
Community Schools”, n.d.).  
Following SB55, community schools could be established as start-ups or conversion 
schools. Start-up community schools are new schools sponsored by external authorizers, while 
conversion community schools are sponsored by the local public school district. As conversion 
charters, authorized by the local school district, generate less competitive pressure, I focus on 
charter school policies related to start-ups, authorized by an outside entity. Previous research 
indicates that public school districts are more threatened or motivated to respond to charter 
school competition when the charter school is sponsored by an external agency (Hess et al., 
2001; Ni & Arsen, 2010; Teske et al., 2001). Since Ohio policy specifically allows for start-up 
charter schools under different circumstances than district sponsored charter schools, the 
inclusion of this distinction better informs this study of the nature of competitive responses in 
educational markets.  
Data Sources 
The data for this analysis were collected from the National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES) Common Core of Data. The financial data, including total expenditures, instructional 
expenditures, and support expenditures were organized by type, year, and district. The collected 
data ranges from 1995 to 2004. According to the NCES, instructional expenditures include 
teachers’ salaries and benefits, as well as instructional supplies and services. In addition to 
financial data, data related to district student demographics, district organization, and district size 
were also collected (National Center for Education Statistics, “N.D.”). 
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Analytical Samples, Plausibility of Inferences, and Models 
There are over 600 publicly-run school districts in Ohio, of which SB55 impacted 8 and 
HB282 impacted 13. Despite the low number of affected districts, since the policies targeted the 
largest districts in Ohio, a significant proportion of students were impacted by these policies. 
Though only a total of 21 districts were directly affected by these policies, SB55 impacted 
316,327 Ohio students (17.47% of Ohio students) in 1998, and HB282 impacted 118,983 Ohio 
students (6.67% of Ohio students) in 2000. In 2000, after the implementation of HB282, over 
400,000 students attended a district that had been targeted by one of these policies.  
Analytical Samples 
District characteristics, including finance characteristics, number of students, grades of 
students, student demographics, Free Lunch Eligibility (FLE), and student Individualized 
Education Plan (IEP) status, are listed in Table 1. Student race, FLE, IEP status, and grade level 
are all reported as a proportion of the total district population. Unfortunately, these data were not 
collected for every school district and therefore the analytical sample is restrained to the 230 
Ohio school districts from which reported data on these characteristics were collected. Lucas 
County school districts which, according to the Ohio Department of Education, were impacted 
by charter school legislation earlier than other SB55 school districts are removed from the 
dataset. Further, because treatment status (i.e. being targeted by charter school policy) is 
inherently associated with certain characteristics such as district size, an additional comparison 
group was created to test the robustness of the findings. The smaller dataset, referred to as the 
“restricted dataset,” only includes comparison districts that had total expenditures or total 
enrollment greater than the smallest HB282 targeted district in 1995. This is in no way a matched 
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sample, but offers some insight into the robustness of the findings. District characteristics, based 
on treatment status, are reported in Table 1.  
Table 1. Mean District Characteristics by Treatment Status (1995-2004)       
 
 
SB55  
Districts 
(n=8) 
HB282 
Districts 
(n=13) 
Comparison 
Districts 
(n=209) 
Restricted 
Comparison 
(n=27) 
%Instruction 
57.44 
(4.00) 
58.06 
(3.19) 
60.48 
(3.05) 
60.33 
(3.28) 
%Support 
38.52 
(3.61) 
38.01 
(3.81) 
35.85 
(3.25) 
36.77 
(3.43) 
Total Expenditures* 
313.42 
(190.45) 
69.15 
(28.02) 
22.94 
(17.22) 
54.26 
(12.32) 
Instructional 
Expenditures* 
180.98 
(111.05) 
40.13 
(16.18) 
13.79 
(10.27) 
32.47 
(6.40) 
Property Tax  
Revenue* 
129.49 
(92.49) 
30.96 
(19.78) 
13.36 
(13.75) 
37.15 
(12.72) 
Total Students 
37402.99 
(21504.98) 
9178.30 
(3808.58) 
3333.68 
(2180.40) 
7636.00 
(551.12) 
%Primary 
48.56 
(2.87) 
47.11 
(2.89) 
43.97 
(2.90) 
42.61 
(2.96) 
%Middle 
22.44 
(1.19) 
22.84 
(1.11) 
23.23 
(1.30) 
22.63 
(1.40) 
%Secondary 
25.54 
(2.17) 
27.82 
(2.74) 
31.00 
(2.48) 
31.71 
(0.75) 
%IEP 
13.89 
(5.30) 
12.98 
(4.94) 
11.08 
(4.65) 
10.90 
(3.53) 
%Free-Lunch Eligible 
54.03 
(14.20) 
37.89 
(15.66) 
16.29 
(11.83) 
6.04 
(2.73) 
%Black 
57.15 
(12.93) 
35.15 
(26.70) 
6.49 
(13.66) 
2.53 
(1.44) 
%Latino 
3.23 
(3.08) 
3.21 
(7.00) 
1.32 
(2.44) 
1.06 
(0.27) 
%Asian 
0.92 
(0.73) 
0.69 
(0.59) 
1.18 
(1.50) 
2.49 
(2.03) 
%Native American 
0.16 
(0.12) 
0.13 
(0.11) 
0.11 
(0.12) 
0.14 
(0.06) 
%White 
36.50 
(13.59) 
58.98 
(26.44) 
89.92 
(14.67) 
92.71 
(3.62) 
*Expressed in millions of dollars (22.1 = $22,100,000.00) 
As seen in Table 1, there were obvious differences between SB55 districts, HB282 
districts, and the comparison non-targeted school districts. These differences were implicit in the 
policies themselves, as SB55 targeted the eight largest school districts in Ohio and HB282 
targeted the next 13 populous districts. For example, SB55 districts had a much larger total 
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student population and budget. HB282 districts also, though to a lesser extent, had larger student 
populations and budgets than the comparison districts. Other differences found between the 
policy targeted districts and comparison districts are typically associated with urban school 
districts such as higher proportions of minority students, FLE students, and IEP students. SB55 
districts, and HB282 districts, allocated a larger proportion of their budgets to support 
expenditures. Support expenditures include maintenance and operations, transportation, school 
district administration, business expenses, and other administrative or support expenditures 
(Common Core of Data, “N.D.”). This was expected as larger urban districts typically have a 
larger, more expensive infrastructure; an additional possible explanation for this difference was 
the higher proportion of students receiving services associated with FLE or IEPs in the more 
densely populated districts. This is not problematic for measuring the impact of SB55 and 
HB282 as the models account for these differences; of greater concern are pre-policy trends in 
instructional resource allocation, an issue discussed in greater detail in the following section.  
Plausibility of Inferences 
In this study, I examined two charter school policies passed in Ohio through the use of 
difference-in-difference (DID), regression discontinuity (RD), and difference-in-regression-
discontinuity (DRD) models, all considered quasi-experimental designs. Quasi-experimental 
designs allow researchers to make limited causal inferences provided certain assumptions are 
met (Shadish & Cook, 2009; Murnane & Willett, 2011); in addition, designs such as DID, RD, 
and DRD are appropriate for estimating the changes in instructional allocation associated with 
charter school policies.  
In the parlance typically associated with random-control trials (RCTs), in the DID and 
DRD models the policy targeted districts are both the treatment and control group. Pre-policy 
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instructional expenditures, the control, are compared to post-policy instructional expenditures, 
the treatment. However, these districts are not randomly assigned and therefore, causal 
inferences cannot be made from such an analysis. The non-impacted districts, the comparison 
group, provide the trend in instructional expenditures in districts not targeted by the policies, and 
by accounting for the trends in the comparison group, I am able to provide a more plausible 
estimate of the change in instructional allocation associated with the policy on policy targeted 
school districts. This model, through the incorporation of the comparison districts, accounts for 
secular trends in instructional expenditures in Ohio and allows for more plausible inferences than 
by examining these trends only using descriptive data (Murnane & Willett, 2011).  
The goal of these models is to account for any variable that may relate to the subjects of 
analysis and the dependent variable, which is not feasible in most educational studies; however, a 
discrete shift in the policies impacting the subjects may provide such an opportunity when the 
studying the impact of the shifting policies (Dynarksi, 2003). In this case, the shift in charter 
school policies, which altered the eligibility of certain districts to compete with externally 
sponsored charter schools, provides an opportunity to examine the impact of these policies on the 
policy targeted districts through the use of DID and DRD designs. These analyses rely on the 
assumption that the comparison school districts’ differences are a reasonable proxy for the 
differences that would have been experienced by the targeted school districts, had the policy not 
existed. I address this assumption by examining the similarity in trends, not similarity in levels, 
between targeted and comparison districts prior to the implementation of the policy—these 
concerns are addressed in Figure 2, which charts the trends of proportion of budgets dedicated to 
instructional expenditures by treatment type. Figure 2 shows pre-policy trends in HB282 districts 
are nearly identical to pre-policy trends in comparison districts. On the other hand, pre-policy 
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trends in the SB55 districts are not identical to comparison districts, and if these differences are 
due to omitted variable bias, it jeopardizes the models’ validity for making reliable inferences. It 
is possible that the differences between SB55 districts and comparison districts are due to district 
characteristics such as district size or student demographics. If that is the case, by accounting for 
those characteristics in the model, I have addressed any concerns related to pre-policy trends. 
The largest concern is the drastic drop in instructional resource allocation the year before the 
activation of SB55 in districts targeted by the policy. Examining each district’s change from 
1996 to 1997, it seems most districts spent less in 1997 than in 1996. However, Cleveland spent 
7.3% less in 1997 and Youngstown spent 5.4% less, decreases much larger than the average 
1.7% in other districts with a decrease in instructional resource allocation. It is possible that pre-
policy trends at Cleveland and Youngstown bias estimates related to SB55. For this reason, 
estimates related to SB55 may provide plausible estimates related to changes in resource 
allocation associated with charter school policies, however, estimates based on HB282 are more 
reliable.     
A further concern of the DID analysis is that it is only able to include observations from 
the year immediately before and immediately after the implementation of the treatment. I test the 
robustness the findings from the DID analyses, and address the weakness of limited time frames, 
by also conducting RD and DRD analyses. Through the RD model, I establish a relationship 
between a continuous measure of time and the proportion of the resources allocated towards a 
district. This produces estimates of the change in resource allocation associated with the policy, 
because the relationship is disrupted at the cut point, activation of the charter school policy. The 
RD analyses measure targeted districts’ instructional resource allocations over time, and estimate 
trends in resource allocation, which allows an examination of how those trends change at the cut-
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point. These changes in the trend represent the effect of the policy on resource allocation the year 
the policy occurred. Conceptually, the difference in means of those just below the cut score and 
those just above the cut score represents the effect of the treatment on those at or near the cut 
score, which assumes that placement just above or below the cut score is just as random as the 
random assignment of a RCT. In fact, Cook, Shadish, and Wong (2008) compared within-study 
causal estimates from a RCT to the estimates produced by a quasi-experiment using the same 
treatment group. The study found that the RD models reproduced comparable results to the RCT 
when analyzed near the cut score. However, these methods also limit the scope in which 
inferences can be made. Inferences are limited to the impact of the policies on the school districts 
directly affected during the years immediately following policy activation. The strongest 
inferences can be drawn from a RD analysis when observations are normally distributed around 
the cut-score; however, these analyses place the cut point longitudinally on the X axis at the time 
of policy activation, with an equal number of observations across the included years. 
Additionally, the RD analyses only contain the school districts targeted by the policy, therefore, 
the model is unable to absorb state-wide secular trends in resource allocation, an advantage of 
the DID and DRD models.  
The DRD models incorporate the longer time frame used by the RD models while still 
accounting for the state-wide secular trends provided by the comparison group in the DID 
models. The DID estimates are based on the interaction of dichotomous indicators of whether the 
district was targeted by the policy and whether the policy was activated, but requires the time 
frame included in the dataset to be limited to one year before and one year after the policy’s 
activation. The RD models estimate the effect of the policies based on the interaction of a 
dichotomous indicator of whether the observation occurred after policy implementation and a 
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continuous indicator of time, but only policy targeted districts are included in the analyses. Using 
the DRD models, I estimate the changes in instructional resource allocation associated with the 
policies based on the interaction of dichotomous indicators of whether the district was targeted 
by the policy and whether the policy was implemented; however, because the dataset contains 
multiple years of data, the model also includes a continuous indicator for year. Through the use 
of several interaction terms and the year term, I estimate the changes in resource allocation in 
targeted districts associated with the activation of the policy immediately following the 
activation of the policy. The DRD exploits the strengths of the DID and the RD by comparing 
districts targeted by the policy after policy activation to districts targeted by the policy before 
policy activation while accounting for trends in districts not targeted by the policy, and including 
observations for multiple years before and after policy activation.  
Each model has its own strengths and weaknesses, and by triangulating the measured 
effects through the use of multiple models, I am more confident in the overlapping estimates 
reported for the analyses. The DID analyses incorporate 230 districts and the secular trends in 
resource allocation across the state, but only include the year before and the year after policy 
activation. The RD analyses incorporate multiple years of observations, and thereby longitudinal 
trends, but are only able to include the districts which were impacted by the policies. The DRD 
analyses are able to include both multiple years of observations and 230 districts. While the DRD 
analyses capitalize on the strengths of the DID and RD models, including the DID and RD 
models triangulates my findings and consistency across analyses and reinforces any overlapping 
findings of the analyses. 
Models 
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The datasets contain annual observations nested within districts. In order to account for 
the within district variation of instructional expenditures over multiple years, I utilize 
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to cluster annual observations for each district, and compare 
the post-policy instructional expenditures to pre-policy instructional expenditures. HLM is 
appropriate for such analyses of longitudinal data (Snijders & Bosker, 1999).  
According to Arsen and Ni (2012), there are several factors identified in the literature 
associated with school district resource allocation. I include the same factors as Arsen and Ni in 
these analyses: total district enrollment in logarithmic form, total district expenditures in 
logarithmic form, property tax revenue per student in logarithmic form, and the percentage of 
district FLE studentsiv. Arsen and Ni also included measurements of student characteristics such 
as the percentage of students that receive special education services and indicators of racial 
characteristics, such measures are also included in these analyses.  
The models are constructed beginning with policy related covariates, which differ based 
on model construction. Next, covariates related to district size are added, such as total number of 
students. Next, covariates related to district organization are added, which include the proportion 
of the district students in primary grades (kindergarten through fifth grade), middle grades (sixth 
through eighth grade), and secondary grades (ninth through twelfth grade). Next, covariates 
related to the characteristics of the student body are added, which include the proportion of the 
students that are identified as African-American, Latino, Asian-American, Native-American, and 
Caucasian, as well as FLE students or students eligible for IEP services. Finally, covariates 
related to district finances are added such as district expenditures and revenues. The dependent 
variable, instructional resource allocation, is calculated as the proportion of the total school 
district budget dedicated to instructional expenditures in a given school district ( ) for a given 
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year ( ):                          ⁄ . I use the DID, RD, and DRD models to examine if SB55 
and HB282, which allowed start-up charter schools to open in public school districts, are 
associated with changes in instructional resource allocation in targeted school districts.  
In the DID models, the variables for each year are nested within a district, comprising the 
level one observations (          ,             ). Thus, the school districts are the 
clustered variable and comprise the level two observations (          ,            )
v. 
Level one covariates, observations pertaining to a single year, are included, however, the only 
level two covariate included is district treatment status, a dichotomous indicator of whether or 
not the district was targeted by charter school policy. In this manner, the HLM serves to cluster 
the standard errors of the school districts over time in the analyses. Level two covariates, such as 
district level means, and district centered measurements were examined, but not found to 
improve model fit.  
According to Meyer (1995), traditional DID designs are sensitive to variations in the 
functional form, meaning small changes in a single equation component may lead to skewed 
reporting of treatment effects. The use of HLM allows additional covariates and other tests of 
model fit. The independent variables in the DID models include a dichotomous indicator of 
whether the district was targeted by a policy (            ), a dichotomous indicator of 
whether the observation occurred before or after the activation of the policy 
(                 ), and an interaction term indicating whether the district was targeted by the 
policy and the policy was activated [(                                )]. By estimating 
the change in instructional resource allocation for districts targeted by the policy when the policy 
was activated, these models estimate the degree to which charter school policies are associated 
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with changes in resource allocation in policy targeted districts. The models are displayed in 
equation 1 and equation 2.  
Equation 1. 
                              (               )                    
Equation 2. 
                                (                )                   
Wherein     measures the proportion of a school district’s budget dedicated to instructional 
expenditures,     is a matrix of district covariates,    measures the level two residual, and     
measures the level one residual. The interaction variable,                ) or(       
         ), reports the size and significance of the changes in instructional resource allocation 
associated with the charter school policies. In order to examine these changes, these models only 
include the years immediately before and after the policies were activatedvi.  
The RD models include multiple years of observations before and policy activation. This 
accounts for pre- and post-policy trends in the targeted school districts; however, the RD datasets 
analyses only include policy targeted districts. In order to estimate changes in resource allocation 
associated with the charter school policies, I place the cut point along the X axis at the time of 
policy activation. By only including districts targeted by the policy, fewer level one observations 
are nested within the district (      = 48,        = 130). Without the inclusion of comparison 
school districts, the level two observations are also fewer in number (      = 8,        = 13). I 
estimate changes in the proportion of district budget allocated for instruction based on an 
interaction of a continuous measure of time and a dichotomous indicator of time of policy 
activation [(                                   )]. Since only districts targeted by the 
policy are included in the analysis, there is no need for an indicator of whether the district was 
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targeted by the policy. However, a dichotomous indicator of whether the observation occurred 
after policy activation (                   ) and a continuous indicator for year (        are 
included. By estimating the change in instructional resource allocation for districts targeted by 
the policy when the policy was activated, but still accounting for trends occurring in the 
surrounding years, I attempt to measure the change in resource allocation at public school 
districts associated with charter school policies. These models are reflected in equation 3 and 
equation 4. 
Equation 3. 
                               (                )                    
Equation 4. 
                               (                )                   
Wherein     measures the proportion of a school district’s budget dedicated to instructional 
expenditures,     is a matrix of district covariates,    measures the level two residual, and     
measures the level one residual. The interaction term [                 ),(       
         )] allows me to report the size and significance of changes in resource allocation 
associated with the charter school policies. An equal number of years before and after the 
implementation of the policies are included in both analysesvii. 
The DRD models include multiple years before and after implementation, as well as a 
comparison group of non-targeted districts, but statistically isolate only the changes associated 
with the policies on the policy-targeted districts immediately following the activation of the 
policies. I estimate changes in resource allocation associated with the charter school policies at 
the time the policy was activated, while still accounting for any secular trends in instructional 
resource allocation. This is done by accounting for trends in time related measures and policy 
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targeted districts, as well as interactions of these measures, and by placing the cut point along the 
X axis at the time of policy activation. In the DRD models, a comparison group is included as 
well as multiple years of analysis leading to a larger number of level one observations (       
    ,              viii, and the same number of level two observations, as seen in the DID 
models (          ,            ). Estimating the changes in the proportion of district 
budgets allocated to instruction associated with the activation of the policy is measured as a 
dichotomous indicator of whether the district was targeted by the policy and whether the 
observation occurred after the policy activated [(                                  )]. 
These estimates are only reliable after accounting for additional measures, including: a 
dichotomous indicator of whether the district was targeted by a policy (            ), a 
dichotomous indicator of whether the observation occurred after policy activation 
(                   ), a continuous indicator for year (       , an indicator for year and 
whether the observation occurred after policy activation [(                          
         )], an indicator for year and whether the district was targeted by the policy [(      
                      )], and an indicator for year, whether the district was targeted by the 
policy, and whether the observation occurred after policy activation [(             
                                   )]. These models are reflected in equation 5 and 
equation 6. 
Equation 5. 
                                        (               )    (      
      )     (                )    (                      )                   
Equation 6. 
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                                            (                ) 
   (             )     (                )    (                       ) 
                 
Wherein     measures the proportion of a school district’s budget dedicated to instructional 
expenditures,     is a matrix of district covariates,    measures the level two residual, and     
measures the level one residual. The interaction variable [                ),(       
         )] measures the change in district instructional resource allocation associated with the 
policy. The DRD models, like the RD models, include an equal number of years before and after 
the activation of the policies. 
Results 
In order to examine the robustness of findings, three methods were used to examine each 
policy. Tables 2 and 3 report the findings from these analyses. Additional tables containing 
parameter estimates for the entire models are located in Appendix A. For each policy a nested 
DID and DRD analysis is reported examining the change in instructional resource allocation 
associated with the charter school policy using both datasets. The RD analyses, unlike the DID 
and DRD analyses, are already restricted to only policy-targeted districts and therefore, only one 
dataset is used to examine the outcomes associated with these analyses; as such, RD results are 
not reported for the restricted sample. The restricted sample comparison group more closely 
resembles SB55 and HB282 districts than the larger comparison group in terms of total 
expenditures, property tax revenue, and total students—three measures important to resource 
allocation (Arsen & Ni, 2012). While the restricted sample is quite dissimilar to the SB55 and 
HB282 districts in regards to percentage of students FLE, percentage of students with an IEP, 
and the racial makeup of the districts, the similarities in district size and finance characteristics 
 35 
 
suggest that the estimates of changes in instructional resource allocation associated with charter 
school policies found using the restricted sample are more reliable than the estimates found using 
the full sample.     
SB55 Outcomes 
Table 2. SB55 Outcomes 
 
 
Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 + 
District Size 
Model 3:  
Model 2 + 
Student 
Levels 
Model 4: 
Model 3 + 
Student 
Characteristics 
Model 5: 
Model 4 + 
District 
Expenditures 
Full sample 
DID(       ) 
RD(    ) 
DRD(      ) 
     
DID (      ) 
1.02* 
(0.51) 
1.02* 
(0.51) 
1.03* 
(0.51) 
1.01* 
(0.51) 
0.99* 
(0.50) 
RD (     ) 
1.01~ 
(0.56) 
1.04~ 
(0.57) 
1.00 
(0.62) 
0.04 
(0.87) 
0.11 
(0.93) 
DRD (       ) 
2.29** 
(0.86) 
2.29** 
(0.85) 
2.32** 
(0.86) 
2.46** 
(0.86) 
2.39** 
(0.83) 
Restricted sample 
DID(     ) 
DRD(     ) 
     
DID (     ) 
1.14* 
(0.56) 
1.13* 
(0.56) 
1.18* 
(0.58) 
1.27* 
(0.56) 
1.30* 
(0.51) 
DRD (      ) 
2.18* 
(0.93) 
2.16* 
(0.93) 
2.54** 
(0.94) 
2.80** 
(0.96) 
2.85** 
(0.93) 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
  
As seen in Table 2, I found in the DID analyses that the change in instructional resource 
allocation associated with SB55 in the districts targeted by SB55 ranged from 0.99% to 1.30%. 
Additionally, the standard errors of this estimate remained stable and slightly diminished with 
the introduction of additional covariates in models two, three, four, and five. The estimates of the 
changes associated with the policy were similar between both samples, despite the diminished 
degrees of freedom in the restricted dataset. The estimates are significant across al l models and 
both datasets (p<0.05). As seen in model five of both datasets, the activation of SB55 resulted in 
an increase in the proportion of the budget dedicated to instructional expenditures between 
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0.99% and 1.30% after accounting for district and student characteristics.  This does not mean 
that SB55 districts allocated more instructional funding relative to other districts, only relative to 
the amount that would have been allocated had the district not been targeted by SB55. If this 
outcome is to believed, districts targeted by SB55 spent between 0.99% and 1.30% more on 
instruction than they would have, had such a policy not existed. Though 1.30% may not seem 
substantial, the average total expenditures for districts targeted by SB55 in 1998 equaled 
$283,894,500.00; therefore, such increases in instruction were equivalent to between 
$2,810,555.55 and $3,690,628.50. Additionally, effect sizeix ranged from 0.34 for the full sample 
to 0.35 for the restricted sample. The result was significant for every model and both datasets 
suggesting that SB55 was associated with significant and substantially higher levels of 
instructional resource allocation. 
I found in the less specified RD models of SB55 marginally significant, positive 
estimates, which supports the findings related to the DID models. However, I found in the more 
specified models that the estimates were not statistically significant. Due to the low number of 
level one and level two observations, I was unable to determine if the undetectable change in 
instructional resource allocation was due to restricted degrees of freedom or the more developed 
model specificity. An assumption of RD designs is that observations at or near the cut point are 
randomly distributed on either side of the cut point, and therefore, the addition of covariates 
should not affect the variables of interest (Lee & Lemieux, 2010). However, considering that I 
examined the same districts over time, this assumption required a shorter leap, as I assumed that 
a given district is not inherently different in 1997 than it was in 1998, a less daunting assumption 
than assuming two different subjects with similar scores are inherently similar. The addition of 
the district covariates ensured that if a district changed in a significant way between the two 
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years that were measured by the covariate, it was included in the analysis and part of the model. 
It is unclear if the drastic changes in parameter estimates seen between model 3 and model 4 
reflect a violation of Lee and Lemieux’s assumption, or if those changes were simply due to the 
constrained number of degrees of freedom. Examining the changes associated with SB55 
through a third quasi-experimental lens, provided additional considerations.  
I found that the DRD analyses of SB55 also supported the findings of the DID analyses. 
In fact, the results found in the DRD analyses suggest that the changes associated with the policy 
were much larger in magnitude than those found in the DID analyses. I found in the DRD 
analyses that the changes in instructional resource allocation associated with SB55 were 
significant across all models and both datasets. As seen in the DID analyses, the estimates from 
the restricted dataset were slightly larger than those found in the full dataset. The estimates are 
robust to changes in sample and model specification. If this outcome is to believed, districts 
targeted by SB55 spent between 2.39% and 2.85% more on instruction than they would have, 
had such a policy not existed. Such increases in instruction were equivalent to between 
$6,785,078.55 and $8,090,993.25. Also, effect size ranged from 0.87 for the full sample to 0.84 
for the restricted sample. The significance of these estimates persisted across DRD models 
(p<0.01). Even though SB55 districts tended to allocate less towards instruction than comparison 
districts, the estimates from the DID and DRD suggest that these districts allocated more towards 
instruction than would have been allocated in the absence of this policy.  
These estimates do not suggest that more money was spent as a result of these policies, 
only that more of the available resources were allocated towards instruction. Additionally, a 
concern about the reliability of the analysis of SB55 is the difference between pre-policy trends 
of policy-targeted districts and the comparison group, as seen in Figure 2. As discussed above, 
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Cleveland and Youngstown school districts were largely responsible for the large, pre-policy 
drop in average instructional resource allocation for SB55 districts. The significance of the 
finding is not robust to removing either Cleveland (p=0.20) or Youngstown (p=0.16) in the DID 
model. In the DRD model, the main finding is robust to removing Cleveland (p=0.01), however 
the main finding is only marginally significant if Youngstown is removed (p=0.06). Also, if both 
Cleveland and Youngstown are removed, the main finding becomes insignificant (p=0.15).  
This relationship between SB55 and the shifting of resources towards instructional 
expenditures suggested the need for further investigation into similar policies to examine if such 
changes in instructional resource allocation are associated with charter school policies or if this 
finding is isolated to some aspect of SB55. The analyses of HB282 provided such an 
investigation. 
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HB282 Outcomes  
Table 3. HB282 Outcomes 
 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
As seen in Table 3, changes in instructional resource allocation associated with being a 
district targeted by HB282 in the year HB282 was activated were not statistically significant in 
any model or dataset. The standard errors of the treatment effect remained stable despite the 
introduction of additional variables in models two, three, four, and five. While these estimates 
are not significant, every estimate found in the DID and DRD models suggested a positive 
directional relationship between HB282 and changes in instructional resource allocation. The 
parameter estimates in the restricted sample are smaller than those found in the full sample, yet 
are still positive. However, this is in no way conclusive evidence supporting the findings from 
the analyses of SB55.  
In the RD analysis of HB282, I found slightly negative estimates of the relationship 
between HB282 and instructional resource allocation; however the estimates are only 1/10 of the 
 
 
Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 + 
District Size 
Model 3:  
Model 2 + 
Student 
Levels 
Model 4: 
Model 3 + 
Student 
Characteristics 
Model 5: 
Model 4 + 
District 
Expenditures 
Full sample  
DID(      ) 
RD(     ) 
DRD(      ) 
     
DID (      ) 
0.30 
(0.38) 
0.30 
(0.38) 
0.30 
(0.38) 
0.31 
(0.38) 
0.42 
(0.38) 
RD (      ) 
-0.07 
(0.17) 
-0.06 
(0.17) 
-0.16 
(0.20) 
0.01 
(0.30) 
-0.04 
(0.28) 
DRD (       ) 
0.69 
(0.56) 
0.69 
(0.56) 
0.69 
(0.56) 
0.66 
(0.56) 
0.78 
(0.55) 
Restricted sample 
DID(     ) 
DRD(     ) 
     
DID (     ) 
0.17 
(0.52) 
0.20 
(0.52) 
0.20 
(0.54) 
0.20 
(0.54) 
0.40 
(0.43) 
DRD (      ) 
0.53 
(0.60) 
0.54 
(0.60) 
0.40 
(0.60) 
0.27 
(0.60) 
0.39 
(0.60) 
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size found in the DID analysis and nearly 1/20 of the size of the estimate found in the DRD 
analyses. Still, this problematizes assumptions about the relationship between charter school 
policies, specifically HB282, and instructional resource allocation; however, it is unclear how to 
interpret the estimates of this analysis considering the small sample and restricted degrees of 
freedom.  
Unlike the findings in the analyses of SB55, the analyses of HB282 do not offer 
compelling evidence of a relationship between charter school policies and changes in 
instructional resource allocation. Depending on the way in which one were to interpret the 
findings of HB282, the mostly positive, yet insignificant, estimates associated with the changes 
in instructional resource allocation could be used as an argument supporting the findings of SB55 
and suggest that charter school policies may be associated with such changes. However, the lack 
of significance in the findings may also suggest that there is something particular about SB55, or 
unobserved variable bias in the model, that resulted in the significant findings which are not 
generalizable to other policies or analyses. Considering the difference between pre-policy trends 
in SB55 districts and the comparison districts, as well as the similarities between the restricted 
sample and HB282 districts, the estimates found in the analyses of HB282 using the restricted 
sample are the most reliable estimates of how changes in charter school policy are associated 
with changes in instructional resource allocation. The most reliable estimates found in the 
previous analyses suggest that the threat of charter school policies is not associated with a 
significant change public school district resource allocation.  
Significance 
Given shrinking budgets, increased accountability, and a national push to improve the 
efficiency of district-run public schools, over the last 20 years there has been an influx of charter 
school policies (Lubienski & Weitzel, 2010). According to economic theory, such competition-
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based reforms should improve the effectiveness and efficiency of district-run schools (Friedman, 
1955; Chubb & Moe, 1990; Hoxby, 2000). However, what we know about the effects of charter 
school competition on district-run public school efficiency is extremely limited. We do not know 
if charter school competition has a statistically measurable, causal effect on district-run public 
school efficiency and leadership behavior, and have little statistical evidence for districts outside 
of Michigan. Recently, the literature has supported the use of instructional resource allocation as 
a proxy for measuring the efficiency of a district (Arsen & Ni,2012; Chakrabarti & Roy, 2012), 
and the use of policies designed to increase, or decrease, competition as a proxy for measuring 
competition (Chakrabarti & Roy, 2012).  
This study builds on this growing literature, relying on resource allocation as a proxy for 
efficiency and charter school policies as proxies for competition to examine the hypothesis that 
increased competition leads to increased efficiency. Though these measures serve as proxies for 
these concepts, it is not clear that such proxies are equivalent to such measures. These analyses 
provide limited evidence on the outcomes of certain Ohio charter school policies, and offer 
important guidance for future research. First, I found positive estimates regarding the impact of 
SB55, though the reliability of these findings is confounded by differences in pre-policy trends. 
Second, I found in my analysis of HB282 positive, but insignificant, estimates of the changes in 
instructional resource allocation associated with the activation of the policy in the DID and DRD 
models; in the RD model I found very small, negative, insignificant estimates. The most 
developed DRD model examining SB55 found that SB55 was associated with 2.39% more 
resources being allocated to instruction than would have been allocated had SB55 not passed. 
While a change of 2.39% in instructional resources may not seem substantial, Cincinnati City 
School District had total expenditures of $358,602,000.00 in 1998; therefore, a change of 2.39% 
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was equivalent to $8,570,587.80, or the salaries of 162 teachers across the districtx. Though the 
findings in the analyses of SB55 suggest that the policy led to greater instructional resource 
allocation than would have been the case had it not been activated, the analysis of HB282 did not 
produce significant results, and for methodological reasons, the analysis of HB282 is more 
reliable. Given the greater reliability of the findings regarding HB282, the most accurate 
description of the findings is that while SB55 may have been associated with higher levels of 
instructional resource allocation, the changes associated with HB282 were not significant.  
With no regard for violated methodological assumptions, and full acceptance that a 
policy threat of competition is an accurate proxy for competition and that instructional resource 
allocation is an accurate proxy for efficiency, the findings from this study could be taken as 
evidence supporting Friedman’s (1955) assertion that increased competition results in increased 
efficiency. However, such an interpretation would be a large, and perhaps flawed, logical leap. 
The most academically honest interpretation of my results is that these findings provide 
unreliable, but possible, evidence of a relationship between certain charter school policies and 
resource allocation in public school districts. Further, the most reliable estimates from this study, 
the analyses of HB282, are not statistically significant. The positive, but insignificant, estimates 
in the DID and DRD analyses of HB282, coupled with the estimates found in the analyses of 
SB55, suggest the possibility of a relationship, but offer no conclusive evidence that charter 
school policies are associated with positive changes in instructional resource allocation at public 
school districts.  
While I provide limited evidence suggesting that charter school policies may lead to 
higher levels of instructional resource allocation, there are a number of limitations and causes for 
concern while interpreting the analyses performed herein beyond those already discussed. First, I 
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examined proxies for efficiency, and while there is a logical argument to be made for the validity 
of changes in instructional resource allocation being used as a measure of effort on the part of 
district administrators to improve efficiency, it has not been demonstrated that changes in 
instructional resource allocation accurately reflect changes in actual efficiencyxi. It is plausible to 
infer that SB55 was associated with higher instructional allocation in the targeted districts; 
however, the analysis of HB282 leads me to question the generalizability of these findings. 
Further, while the analyses of SB55 produced significant estimates, the lack of significance in 
the RD model, suggests that any inferences must be made cautiously. In order to assert the 
existence of relationship between charter school policies and instructional resource allocation 
additional studies of other policies in other contexts are needed.  
Finally, I do not examine if these resources were used efficiently, or if the shift of funds 
from support expenditures to instructional expenditures benefited students in any measureable 
way. This study relied heavily on the use of proxies for measures of competition and measures of 
efficiency. Further examination of how competition, effectiveness, and efficiency is measured, 
particularly in studies examining how charter schools and charter school policies impact public 
school districts, is needed if researchers and policy makers wish to understand how these reforms 
are impacting students and schools. The most reliable finding from this study is a demonstrable 
need for further examination of how market-based reforms impact publicly-run school districts.
                                                 
i
 While charter schools are publicly funded, I am drawing a distinction between charter schools and public school 
districts or publicly-run school districts. Public school districts, in this case, are typically referred to in the literature 
as “traditional public school districts.” 
ii
 Also known as the “EdChoice Scholarship Plan.” 
iii
 Akron, Canton, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Toledo, and Youngstown 
iv
 Arsen and Ni (2012) include the percentage of students eligible for free and reduced lunch, but due to data 
constraints only measurements for free lunch are available and included in these analyses. 
v
 Here I have reported    and    for the larger dataset, the restricted dataset contains fewer observations. The number 
of observations in the restricted dataset for each model is reported in Table 2 and Table 3.  
vi
 The model examining SB55 includes 1997 and 1998, and the model examining HB282 includes 1999 and 2000, 
thereby including the year immediately before and the year immediately after policy activation. 
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vii
 The RD and DRD models examining SB55 include 1995 through 2000, three years before and after policy 
activation because the earliest available data is 1995. The RD and DRD models examining HB282 include 1995 
through 2004, including five years before and five years after policy activation. 
viii
 As in the RD model, the SB55 analysis includes 6 years of observations and the HB282 analysis includes 10 
years of data. For this reason, despite there being more level two observations in the SB55 analysis, there are more 
level one observations in the HB282 analysis. 
ix
 Effect size is calculated using the following equation: Effect Size =           √                      ⁄ , 
where the level two error variance refers to the level two error variance of the null model. For details on the model 
statistics refer to Appendix A.  
x
 The average teacher in Cincinnati City school district made $52,690 in 2000 (the earliest available data), according 
to the Ohio Department of Education data warehouse (“ODE Data Warehouse Reports”, N.D.).  
xi
 Efficiency measured as effectiveness as a function of cost, i.e.  
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TABLES 
Table 4. The DID Effects of SB55 on Instructional Resource Allocation 
 
               
Null Model Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 + 
District 
Size 
Model 3:  
Model 2 + 
Student 
Levels 
Model 4: 
Model 3 + 
Student 
Characteristics 
Model 5: 
Model 4 + 
District 
Expenditures 
 Intercept: 
 57.50*** 
(1.07) 
61.07*** 
(3.33) 
60.46*** 
(4.65) 
56.83*** 
(4.80) 
11.39 
(10.94) 
%Change in Ins. 
Resource Allocation 
 1.02* 
(0.51) 
1.02* 
(0.51) 
1.03* 
(0.51) 
1.01* 
(0.51) 
0.99* 
(0.50) 
SB55 
 -4.35*** 
(1.09) 
-3.53** 
(1.31) 
-3.31* 
(1.34) 
-1.88 
(1.35) 
-1.32 
(1.28) 
After Policy 
 -0.13 
(0.09) 
-0.13 
(0.09) 
-0.11 
(0.10) 
-0.05 
(0.11) 
0.35** 
(0.12) 
                
 
 
-0.34 
(0.30) 
-0.29 
(0.31) 
0.25 
(0.32) 
8.31*** 
(1.40) 
%Primary 
 
  
-0.50 
(5.08) 
13.19~ 
(7.46) 
7.49 
(7.26) 
%Middle 
 
  
-5.82 
(8.23) 
3.40 
(10.01) 
1.67 
(9.65) 
%Secondary 
 
  
6.52 
(5.87) 
13.78~ 
(8.25) 
11.86 
(7.97) 
%IEP Students 
 
   
7.59 
(6.26) 
12.95* 
(6.05) 
%Free Lunch 
 
   
-0.31 
(1.97) 
-1.43 
(2.15) 
%Black 
 
   
-16.48** 
(6.23) 
-9.76 
(6.11) 
%Latino 
 
   
3.46 
(8.92) 
7.01 
(8.52) 
%Asian 
 
   
-33.62* 
(16.55) 
13.62 
(17.51) 
%Native 
 
   
-147.15 
(117.71) 
-116.73 
(112.69) 
%White 
 
   
-9.83 
(6.15) 
-6.55 
(5.98) 
                    
 
    
-8.16*** 
(1.42) 
                 
 
    
0.50 
(0.54) 
Level One Error 
Variance 
1.02*** 
(0.10) 
1.00*** 
(0.09) 
1.00*** 
(0.09) 
1.00*** 
(0.09) 
0.98*** 
(0.09) 
0.93*** 
(0.09) 
Level Two Error 
Variance 
8.65*** 
(0.86) 
8.17*** 
(0.81) 
8.13*** 
(0.81) 
8.13*** 
(0.81) 
6.81*** 
(0.69) 
6.00*** 
(0.61) 
a.                     
b.                         
c. log(property tax per pupil revenue) 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 5. The RD Effects of SB55 on Instructional Resource Allocation 
 
            
Null Model Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 + 
District 
Size 
Model 3:  
Model 2 + 
Student 
Levels 
Model 4: 
Model 3 + 
Student 
Characteristics 
Model 5: 
Model 4 + 
District 
Expenditures 
 Intercept: 
 
 57.27*** 
(1.33) 
47.75* 
(19.70) 
34.53 
(22.83) 
20.30 
(38.93) 
26.00 
(67.84) 
%Change in Ins. 
Resource Allocation 
 1.01~ 
(0.56) 
1.04~ 
(0.57) 
1.00 
(0.62) 
0.04 
(0.87) 
0.11 
(0.93) 
Year 
 -1.29** 
(0.40) 
-1.29** 
(0.40) 
-1.30** 
(0.39) 
-0.28 
(0.77) 
-0.29 
(0.81) 
After Policy 
 1.68 
(1.00) 
1.67 
(1.01) 
2.36* 
(1.05) 
1.88 
(1.11) 
1.98~ 
(1.15) 
                
 
 
0.91 
(1.89) 
0.53 
(2.05) 
2.12 
(3.49) 
3.88 
(7.02) 
%Primary 
 
  
20.83 
(17.07) 
71.71~ 
(35.92) 
74.06~ 
(37.11) 
%Middle 
 
  
0.59 
(53.52) 
71.51 
(65.43) 
66.90 
(66.46) 
%Secondary 
 
  
28.62 
(35.30) 
83.47 
(57.75) 
86.12 
(58.09) 
%IEP Students 
 
   
-18.27 
(11.57) 
-18.89 
(11.79) 
%Free Lunch 
 
   
0.89 
(1.76) 
0.67 
(1.84) 
%Black 
 
   
-52.50 
(36.19) 
-52.84 
(36.27) 
%Latino 
 
   
-102.76 
(78.04) 
-96.58 
(80.56) 
%Asian 
 
   
-208.69 
(281.54) 
-218.04 
(280.97) 
%Native 
 
   
-1349.46 
(877.58) 
-1326.69 
(881.11) 
%White 
 
   
-45.61 
(37.17) 
-46.07 
(37.20) 
                    
 
    
-1.40 
(6.12) 
                 
 
    
1.10 
(3.42) 
Level One Error 
Variance 
3.65*** 
(0.82) 
2.54*** 
(0.57) 
2.55*** 
(0.57) 
2.36*** 
(0.53) 
1.94*** 
(0.46) 
1.94*** 
(0.47) 
Level Two Error 
Variance 
11.94* 
(6.28) 
12.12* 
(6.27) 
11.51* 
(6.00) 
12.10* 
(6.35) 
16.25 
(10.78) 
15.93 
(11.28) 
a.                     
b.                         
c. log(property tax per pupil revenue) 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 6. The DRD Effects of SB55 on Instructional Resource Allocation 
 
          
      
Null Model Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 + 
District 
Size 
Model 3:  
Model 2 + 
Student 
Levels 
Model 4: 
Model 3 + 
Student 
Characteristics 
Model 5: 
Model 4 + 
District 
Expenditures 
 Intercept: 
 57.27*** 
(1.04) 
62.16*** 
(3.04) 
60.73*** 
(3.67) 
58.12*** 
(3.79) 
122.92*** 
(7.41) 
%Change in Ins. 
Resource Allocation 
 2.29** 
(0.86) 
2.29** 
(0.85) 
2.32** 
(0.86) 
2.46** 
(0.86) 
2.39** 
(0.83) 
SB55 
 -5.93*** 
(1.21) 
-4.81*** 
(1.38) 
-4.71*** 
(1.39) 
-3.98** 
(1.41) 
-3.43* 
(1.35) 
Year 
 0.37*** 
(0.06) 
0.38*** 
(0.06) 
0.36*** 
(0.06) 
0.68*** 
(0.10) 
0.75*** 
(0.10) 
After Policy 
 -0.61*** 
(0.16) 
-0.61*** 
(0.16) 
-0.57*** 
(0.16) 
-0.75*** 
(0.17) 
-0.39* 
(0.17) 
SB55*Year 
 -1.66*** 
(0.34) 
-1.66*** 
(0.34) 
-1.65***  
(0.34) 
-1.72*** 
(0.35) 
-1.79*** 
(0.34) 
After Policy*Year 
 -0.70*** 
(0.09) 
-0.70*** 
(0.09) 
-0.69*** 
(0.09) 
-0.96*** 
(0.11) 
-0.55*** 
(0.12) 
SB55*Year*After 
 1.71 
(0.48) 
1.70*** 
(0.48) 
1.72*** 
(0.48) 
1.82*** 
(0.49) 
1.98*** 
(0.47) 
                
 
 
-0.47~ 
(0.27) 
-0.45 
(0.28) 
-0.01 
(0.28) 
8.01*** 
(0.86) 
%Primary 
 
  
2,17 
(3.14) 
0.44 
(4.93) 
1.10 
(4.76) 
%Middle 
 
  
-6.51 
(4.41) 
-9.22 
(5.84) 
-6.09 
(5.65) 
%Secondary 
 
  
6.22~ 
(3.45) 
2.22 
(5.19) 
3.41 
(5.01) 
%IEP Students 
 
   
-7.71*** 
(1.91) 
-4.63* 
(1.87) 
%Free Lunch 
 
   
1.43~ 
(0.83) 
0.83 
(0.82) 
%Black 
 
   
-1.43 
(4.49) 
0.68 
(4.34) 
%Latino 
 
   
14.16~ 
(7.17) 
13.18~ 
(6.90) 
%Asian 
 
   
-19.63 
(12.23) 
3.75 
(12.45) 
%Native 
 
   
-21.57 
(58.52) 
-12.23 
(56.53) 
%White 
 
   
3.91 
(4.40) 
3.05 
(4.25) 
                    
 
    
-8.15*** 
(0.84) 
                 
 
    
0.78* 
(0.35) 
Level One Error 
Variance 
1.93*** 
(0.08) 
1.78*** 
(0.07) 
1.78*** 
(0.07) 
1.77*** 
(0.07) 
1.75*** 
(0.07) 
1.63*** 
(0.07) 
Level Two Error 
Variance 
7.48*** 
(0.73) 
7.18*** 
(0.70) 
7.14*** 
(0.69) 
7.12*** 
(0.07) 
6.21*** 
(0.61) 
5.65*** 
(0.56) 
a.                     
b.                         
c. log(property tax per pupil revenue) 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 7. The DID Effects of SB55 on Instructional Resource Allocation (Comparison) 
 
             
Null Model Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 + 
District 
Size 
Model 3:  
Model 2 + 
Student 
Levels 
Model 4: 
Model 3 + 
Student 
Characteristics 
Model 5: 
Model 4 + 
District 
Expenditures 
 Intercept: 
 
57.50*** 
(1.31) 
36.58* 
(14.08) 
27.87~ 
(15.35) 
42.85** 
(13.29) 
158.32*** 
(31.07) 
%Change in Ins. 
Resource Allocation 
 1.14* 
(0.56) 
1.13* 
(0.56) 
1.18* 
(0.58) 
1.27* 
(0.56) 
1.30* 
(0.51) 
SB55 
 -3.42* 
(1.43) 
-6.32* 
(2.40) 
-5.36* 
(2.44) 
-1.30 
(2.22) 
-0.13 
(2.11) 
After Policy 
 -0.25 
(0.23) 
-0.25 
(0.23) 
-0.26 
(0.24) 
-0.17 
(0.24) 
0.36 
(0.26) 
                
 
 
2.01 
(1.35) 
2.17 
(1.38) 
0.83 
(1.15) 
13.37*** 
(3.30) 
%Primary 
 
  
-6.18 
(12.61) 
16.24 
(15.17) 
6.58 
(14.14) 
%Middle 
 
  
36.32 
(26.79) 
32.35 
(28.51) 
19.12 
(26.28) 
%Secondary 
 
  
9.46 
(14.00) 
6.54 
(16.20) 
7.08 
(15.14) 
%IEP Students 
 
   
11.55 
(16.91) 
12.58 
(15.75) 
%Free Lunch 
 
   
1.34 
(4.52) 
-1.19 
(4.78) 
%Black 
 
   
-18.86* 
(8.44) 
-9.06 
(8.12) 
%Latino 
 
   
12.50 
(14.94) 
23.86 
(14.14) 
%Asian 
 
   
-8.72 
(29.35) 
21.70 
(29.99) 
%Native 
 
   
125.05 
(293.16) 
74.15 
(275.81) 
%White 
 
   
-7.48 
(8.29) 
-3.53 
(7.64) 
                    
 
    
-13.62*** 
(3.47) 
                 
 
    
2.07 
(1.50) 
Level One Error 
Variance 
1.14*** 
(0.23) 
1.05*** 
(0.21) 
1.05*** 
(0.21) 
1.01*** 
(0.21) 
0.91*** 
(0.19) 
0.75*** 
(0.16) 
Level Two Error 
Variance 
13.70*** 
(2.91) 
12.62*** 
(2.68) 
12.03*** 
(2.57) 
11.70*** 
(2.50) 
6.97*** 
(1.54) 
6.16*** 
(1.36) 
a.                     
b.                         
c. log(property tax per pupil revenue) 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 8. The DRD Effects of SB55 on Instructional Resource Allocation (comparison) 
 
              
Null Model Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 + 
District 
Size 
Model 3:  
Model 2 + 
Student 
Levels 
Model 4: 
Model 3 + 
Student 
Characteristics 
Model 5: 
Model 4 + 
District 
Expenditures 
 Intercept: 
 57.27*** 
(1.24) 
36.82** 
(12.32) 
28.88* 
(12.41) 
39.02*** 
(10.76) 
121.17*** 
(18.69) 
%Change in Ins. 
Resource Allocation 
 2.18* 
(0.93) 
2.16* 
(0.93) 
2.54** 
(0.94) 
2.80** 
(0.96) 
2.85** 
(0.93) 
SB55 
 -4.77** 
(1.51) 
-7.60*** 
(2.26) 
-6.95** 
(2.28) 
-3.61~ 
(2.10) 
-2.61 
(1.96) 
Year 
 0.20 
(0.15) 
0.20 
(0.15) 
0.21 
(0.15) 
0.62** 
(0.24) 
0.73** 
(0.23) 
After Policy 
 -0.50 
(0.38) 
-0.50 
(0.37) 
-0.42 
(0.38) 
-0.74~ 
(0.40) 
-0.38 
(0.40) 
SB55*Year 
 -1.49*** 
(0.37) 
-1.48*** 
(0.37) 
-1.51***  
(0.37) 
-1.61*** 
(0.40) 
-1.71*** 
(0.39) 
After Policy*Year 
 -0.36~ 
(0.21) 
-0.35 
(0.21) 
-0.31 
(0.21) 
-0.65* 
(0.27) 
-0.17 
(0.27) 
SB55*Year*After 
 1.37** 
(0.52) 
1.41** 
(0.52) 
1.31* 
(0.52) 
1.40* 
(0.55) 
1.56** 
(0.53) 
                
 
 
1.96~ 
(1.18) 
1.58 
(1.17) 
0.77 
(0.98) 
8.98*** 
(1.91) 
%Primary 
 
  
13.67~ 
(7.28) 
8.51 
(10.67) 
12.47 
(10.35) 
%Middle 
 
  
8.69 
(14.34) 
4.79 
(16.22) 
2.55 
(15.65) 
%Secondary 
 
  
14.30~ 
(8.40) 
0.90 
(11.80) 
9.34 
(11.43) 
%IEP Students 
 
   
-8.82* 
(4.40) 
-5.74 
(4.29) 
%Free Lunch 
 
   
1.44 
(1.32) 
1.02 
(1.27) 
%Black 
 
   
1.46 
(8.18) 
3.02 
(7.87) 
%Latino 
 
   
23.74~ 
(12.94) 
26.11* 
(12.20) 
%Asian 
 
   
-4.89 
(21.97) 
15.35 
(22.21) 
%Native 
 
   
73.51 
(180.63) 
50.71 
(172.64) 
%White 
 
   
10.18 
(8.10) 
8.25 
(7.81) 
                    
 
    
-9.11*** 
(1.87) 
                 
 
    
0.47 
(0.88) 
Level One Error 
Variance 
2.06*** 
(0.19) 
1.84*** 
(0.17) 
1.83*** 
(0.17) 
1.78*** 
(0.16) 
1.78*** 
(0.16) 
1.67*** 
(0.15) 
Level Two Error 
Variance 
11.50*** 
(2.42) 
10.84*** 
(2.28) 
10.58*** 
(2.23) 
10.13*** 
(2.13) 
6.28*** 
(1.38) 
5.26*** 
(1.15) 
a.                     
b.                         
c. log(property tax per pupil revenue) 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 53 
 
Table 9. The DID Effects of HB282 on Instructional Resource Allocation 
 
 
               
Null Model Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 + 
District 
Size 
Model 3:  
Model 2 + 
Student 
Levels 
Model 4: 
Model 3 + 
Student 
Characteristics 
Model 5: 
Model 4 + 
District 
Expenditures 
 Intercept: 
 58.07*** 
(0.83) 
59.15*** 
(3.13) 
59.28*** 
(4.34) 
55.44*** 
(4.60) 
98.29*** 
(12.09) 
%Change in Ins. 
Resource Allocation 
 0.30 
(0.38) 
0.30 
(0.38) 
0.30 
(0.38) 
0.31 
(0.38) 
0.42 
(0.38) 
HB282 
 -2.54** 
(0.85) 
-2.41* 
(0.94) 
-2.59** 
(0.96) 
-2.27* 
(0.98) 
-1.72~ 
(0.95) 
After Policy 
 -0.59*** 
(0.09) 
-0.59*** 
(0.09) 
-0.58*** 
(0.09) 
-0.58*** 
(0.09) 
-0.27* 
(0.12) 
                
 
 
-0.12 
(0.33) 
-0.14 
(0.34) 
0.39 
(0.35) 
4.86** 
(1.45) 
%Primary 
 
  
2.77 
(5.04) 
11.07 
(7.39) 
10.16 
(7.25) 
%Middle 
 
  
-2.19 
(7.89) 
9.01 
(9.58) 
14.22 
(9.52) 
%Secondary 
 
  
-2.73 
(5.35) 
5.46 
(7.75) 
10.18 
(7.67) 
%IEP Students 
 
   
2.80 
(5.92) 
7.95 
(5.90) 
%Free Lunch 
 
   
0.69 
(2.01) 
-1.47 
(2.16) 
%Black 
 
   
-14.00* 
(6.40) 
-11.96~ 
(6.33) 
%Latino 
 
   
6.99 
(8.88) 
6.39 
(8.63) 
%Asian 
 
   
-44.06** 
(15.76) 
-8.71 
(17.07) 
%Native 
 
   
-142.01 
(113.98) 
-141.25 
(112.49) 
%White 
 
   
-8.61 
(6.26) 
-9.16 
(6.18) 
                    
 
    
-4.46** 
(1.47) 
                 
 
    
-0.69 
(0.55) 
Level One Error 
Variance 
1.05*** 
(0.10) 
0.89*** 
(0.08) 
0.89*** 
(0.08) 
0.88*** 
(0.08) 
0.88*** 
(0.08) 
0.87*** 
(0.08) 
Level Two Error 
Variance 
8.29*** 
(0.84) 
8.06*** 
(0.81) 
8.05*** 
(0.81) 
8.08*** 
(0.81) 
6.92*** 
(0.71) 
6.33*** 
(0.66) 
a.                     
b.                         
c. log(property tax per pupil revenue) 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 10. The RD Effects of HB282 on Instructional Resource Allocation 
 
              
Null Model Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 + 
District 
Size 
Model 3:  
Model 2 + 
Student 
Levels 
Model 4: 
Model 3 + 
Student 
Characteristics 
Model 5: 
Model 4 + 
District 
Expenditures 
 Intercept: 
 57.92*** 
(0.83) 
53.50** 
(14.43) 
31.71~ 
(16.82) 
48.14** 
(14.92) 
105.09** 
(31.64) 
%Change in Ins. 
Resource Allocation 
 -0.07 
(0.17) 
-0.06 
(0.17) 
-0.16 
(0.20) 
0.01 
(0.30) 
-0.04 
(0.28) 
Year 
 -0.13 
(0.12) 
-0.12 
(0.12) 
-0.04 
(0.13) 
-0.05 
(0.24) 
0.19 
(0.26) 
After Policy 
 -0.30 
(0.50) 
-0.29 
(0.50) 
-0.46 
(0.50) 
-0.56 
(0.57) 
-0.43 
(0.56) 
                
 
 
0.49 
(1.59) 
1.24 
(1.58) 
-0.15 
(1.36) 
-0.37 
(2.64) 
%Primary 
 
  
18.20~ 
(10.13) 
-4.19 
(14.96) 
-4.21 
(14.32) 
%Middle 
 
  
14.68 
(17.44) 
9.15 
(18.56) 
14.00 
(17.82) 
%Secondary 
 
  
11.12 
(12.12) 
-3.44 
(15.24) 
0.77 
(14.65) 
%IEP Students 
 
   
-0.26 
(6.18) 
-1.63 
(5.92) 
%Free Lunch 
 
   
-2.27 
(3.40) 
-4.85 
(3.33) 
%Black 
 
   
10.35 
(8.17) 
11.11 
(7.79) 
%Latino 
 
   
42.54 
(10.06) 
44.02*** 
(9.52) 
%Asian 
 
   
-201.26* 
(90.03) 
-53.38 
(94.45) 
%Native 
 
   
-27.84 
(235.65) 
21.22 
(224.83) 
%White 
 
   
15.56~ 
(8.40) 
15.93 
(8.07) 
                    
 
    
-1.84 
(2.81) 
                 
 
    
-3.04** 
(1.00) 
Level One Error 
Variance 
2.26*** 
(0.30) 
1.89*** 
(0.25) 
1.89*** 
(0.25) 
1.84*** 
(0.24) 
1.80*** 
(0.24) 
1.65*** 
(0.23) 
Level Two Error 
Variance 
7.83** 
(3.16) 
7.87** 
(3.16) 
7.63** 
(3.14) 
6.85** 
(2.85) 
1.09* 
(0.64) 
0.87~ 
(0.55) 
a.                     
b.                         
c. log(property tax per pupil revenue) 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 11. The DRD Effects of HB282 on Instructional Resource Allocation  
 
          
      
Null Model Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 + 
District 
Size 
Model 3:  
Model 2 + 
Student 
Levels 
Model 4: 
Model 3 + 
Student 
Characteristics 
Model 5: 
Model 4 + 
District 
Expenditures 
 Intercept: 
 57.92*** 
(0.80) 
62.95*** 
(2.58) 
60.73*** 
(3.26) 
57.75*** 
(3.37) 
113.49*** 
(6.22) 
%Change in Ins. 
Resource Allocation 
 0.69 
(0.56) 
0.69 
(0.56) 
0.69 
(0.56) 
0.66 
(0.56) 
0.78 
(0.55) 
HB282 
 -2.97*** 
(0.88) 
-2.34* 
(0.93) 
-2.16* 
(0.93) 
-1.49 
(0.94) 
-0.59 
(0.92) 
Year 
 0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.16** 
(0.05) 
0.40*** 
(0.06) 
After Policy 
 -0.99*** 
(0.14) 
-0.99*** 
(0.14) 
-0.99*** 
(0.14) 
1.09*** 
(0.15) 
-0.76*** 
(0.15) 
HB282*Year 
 -0.21 
(0.14) 
-0.22 
(0.14) 
-0.19 
(0.14) 
-0.18 
(0.14) 
-0.17 
(0.13) 
After Policy*Year 
 -0.16*** 
(0.05) 
-0.17*** 
(0.05) 
-0.17*** 
(0.05) 
-0.24*** 
(0.06) 
-0.17** 
(0.06) 
HB282*Year*After 
 0.10 
(0.19) 
0.10 
(0.19) 
0.06 
(0.19) 
0.03 
(0.19) 
0.08 
(0.19) 
                
 
 
-0.56* 
(0.27) 
-0.53~ 
(0.27) 
-0.15 
(0.28) 
6.20*** 
(0.67) 
%Primary 
 
  
2.40 
(2.21) 
2.39 
(2.93) 
2.76 
(2.86) 
%Middle 
 
  
-6.08~ 
(3.44) 
-5.67 
(3.86) 
-3.64 
(3.78) 
%Secondary 
 
  
8.22** 
(2.90) 
7.79* 
(3.48) 
8.44* 
(3.41) 
%IEP Students 
 
   
-2.53 
(1.62) 
-0.77 
(1.59) 
%Free Lunch 
 
   
1.27 
(0.87) 
1.14 
(0.87) 
%Black 
 
   
-4.57* 
(2.28) 
-2.49 
(2.24) 
%Latino 
 
   
15.82** 
(5.22) 
14.75** 
(5.11) 
%Asian 
 
   
-13.72 
(8.60) 
-4.24 
(8.62) 
%Native 
 
   
13.72 
(44.83) 
23.47 
(43.73) 
%White 
 
   
1.11 
(2.03) 
1.49 
(1.98) 
                    
 
    
-6.72*** 
(0.65) 
                 
 
    
0.74* 
(0.30) 
Level One Error 
Variance 
2.53*** 
(0.08) 
2.30*** 
(0.07) 
2.29*** 
(0.07) 
2.27*** 
(0.07) 
2.26*** 
(0.07) 
2.15*** 
(0.07) 
Level Two Error 
Variance 
7.15*** 
(0.70) 
6.85*** 
(0.67) 
6.92*** 
(0.68) 
6.90*** 
(0.68) 
5.89*** 
(0.59) 
5.65*** 
(0.58) 
a.                     
b.                         
c. log(property tax per pupil revenue) 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 12. The DID Effects of HB282 on Instructional Resource Allocation (comparison) 
 
             
Null Model Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 + 
District 
Size 
Model 3:  
Model 2 + 
Student 
Levels 
Model 4: 
Model 3 + 
Student 
Characteristics 
Model 5: 
Model 4 + 
District 
Finances 
 Intercept: 
 58.07*** 
(0.98) 
38.22* 
(16.17) 
31.34~ 
(16.48) 
60.09** 
(18.78) 
251.54*** 
(37.48) 
%Change in Ins. 
Resource Allocation 
 0.17 
(0.52) 
0.20 
(0.52) 
0.20 
(0.54) 
0.20 
(0.54) 
0.40 
(0.43) 
HB282 
 -2.23~ 
(0.85) 
-2.62* 
(1.22) 
-3.53* 
(1.33) 
-1.84 
(1.78) 
-0.75 
(1.63) 
After Policy 
 -0.45 
(0.30) 
-0.44 
(0.30) 
-0.27 
(0.32) 
-0.46 
(0.32) 
1.02** 
(0.36) 
                
 
 
2.19 
(1.78) 
1.82 
(1.71) 
-0.97 
(1.85) 
18.32*** 
(3.72) 
%Primary 
 
  
29.56~ 
(15.02) 
78.04* 
(29.55) 
43.77 
(28.53) 
%Middle 
 
  
-23.08 
(36.39) 
86.10~ 
(47.40) 
59.21 
(40.58) 
%Secondary 
 
  
5.60 
(17.06) 
56.70 
(35.13) 
45.45 
(31.58) 
%IEP Students 
 
   
6.73 
(18.11) 
19.53 
(15.48) 
%Free Lunch 
 
   
3.73 
(5.83) 
-1.67 
(5.70) 
%Black 
 
   
-74.86* 
(30.00) 
-34.36 
(28.37) 
%Latino 
 
   
-34.30 
(31.77) 
7.97 
(30.15) 
%Asian 
 
   
-78.15~ 
(39.42) 
8.21 
(40.47) 
%Native 
 
   
-555.77 
(409.02) 
-669.76~ 
(367.34) 
%White 
 
   
-64.58* 
(30.14) 
-35.50 
(27.97) 
                    
 
    
-21.34*** 
(3.79) 
                 
 
    
1.32 
(1.42) 
Level One Error 
Variance 
1.27*** 
(0.28) 
1.18*** 
(0.26) 
1.18*** 
(0.26) 
1.22*** 
(0.28) 
1.17*** 
(0.27) 
0.69*** 
(0.17) 
Level Two Error 
Variance 
12.22*** 
(2.88) 
11.25*** 
(2.65) 
10.89*** 
(2.57) 
9.51*** 
(2.34) 
5.30*** 
(1.36) 
4.76*** 
(1.26) 
a.                     
b.                         
c. log(property tax per pupil revenue) 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 13. The DRD Effects of HB282 on Instructional Resource Allocation  
 
              
Null Model Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 + 
District 
Size 
Model 3:  
Model 2 + 
Student 
Levels 
Model 4: 
Model 3 + 
Student 
Characteristics 
Model 5: 
Model 4 + 
District 
Expenditures 
 Intercept 
 57.92*** 
(0.88) 
45.88*** 
(9.39) 
34.13** 
(10.58) 
33.61** 
(10.57) 
113.82*** 
(18.35) 
%Change in Ins. 
Resource Allocation 
 0.53 
(0.60) 
0.54 
(0.60) 
0.40 
(0.60) 
0.27 
(0.60) 
0.39 
(0.60) 
HB282 
 -2.52* 
(1.12) 
-2.74* 
(1.11) 
-2.51* 
(1.14) 
-2.90* 
(1.20) 
-2.31* 
(1.08) 
Year 
 0.07 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
0.08 
(0.09) 
0.08 
(0.13) 
0.38** 
(0.14) 
After Policy 
 -0.83* 
(0.34) 
-0.81* 
(0.34) 
-0.76* 
(0.34) 
0.77* 
(0.37) 
-0.46 
(0.37) 
HB282*Year 
 -0.19 
(0.15) 
-0.18 
(0.15) 
-0.12 
(0.15) 
-0.12 
(0.15) 
-0.09 
(0.15) 
After Policy*Year 
 -0.18 
(0.12) 
-0.18 
(0.12) 
-0.21~ 
(0.12) 
-0.19 
(0.15) 
-0.19 
(0.15) 
HB282*Year*After 
 0.12 
(0.21) 
0.13 
(0.21) 
0.06 
(0.21) 
0.02 
(0.22) 
0.06 
(0.22) 
                
 
 
1.33 
(1.03) 
1.57 
(1.03) 
1.48 
(1.01) 
6.02*** 
(1.54) 
%Primary 
 
  
10.96~ 
(5.85) 
1.53 
(8.04) 
2.72 
(7.85) 
%Middle 
 
  
3.30 
(8.50) 
-2.59 
(10.05) 
-2.27 
(9.85) 
%Secondary 
 
  
13.41~ 
(7.35) 
6.78 
(9.47) 
11.63 
(9.29) 
%IEP Students 
 
   
-0.83 
(3.87) 
-0.74 
(3.80) 
%Free Lunch 
 
   
4.45* 
(2.18) 
2.92 
(2.10) 
%Black 
 
   
3.83 
(5.70) 
4.12 
(5.53) 
%Latino 
 
   
26.64** 
(9.51) 
30.05*** 
(8.07) 
%Asian 
 
   
-4.89 
(15.64) 
14.02 
(14.98) 
%Native 
 
   
78.57 
(123.41) 
81.91 
(120.82) 
%White 
 
   
8.61 
(5.45) 
7.90 
(5.33) 
                    
 
    
-6.40*** 
(1.54) 
                 
 
    
-0.90 
(0.71) 
Level One Error 
Variance 
2.13*** 
(0.16) 
1.86*** 
(0.14) 
1.86*** 
(0.14) 
1.84*** 
(0.14) 
1.83*** 
(0.14) 
1.78*** 
(0.13) 
Level Two Error 
Variance 
9.93*** 
(2.27) 
9.05*** 
(2.07) 
8.56*** 
(1.97) 
8.26*** 
(1.93) 
5.50*** 
(1.39) 
3.72*** 
(0.94) 
a.                     
b.                         
c. log(property tax per pupil revenue) 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of students enrolled in Ohio schools 
 
Figure 2: Percent of budget dedicated to instruction by treatment status 
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PAPER 3 
MEASURING COMPETITION: INCONSISTENT DEFINITIONS, INCONSISTENT 
RESULTS 
Market-based educational reforms have enjoyed great expansion in recent decades, both 
in the United States and throughout the world (Lubienski & Linick, 2011). In light of attention 
from policy makers, researchers, and the media, there have been many studies of the effects of 
competition on schools; however, these study designs have lacked consistency in how 
competition is defined and measured. Perhaps, the lack of a consistent definition for competition 
is partially responsible for the inconclusive evidence supporting or condemning the use of 
competition as a method of educational reform.  
Understanding the function of competition in educational markets has become more and 
more important in recent decades as countries have increasingly moved their education systems 
to decentralized and competitive structures (Lubienski & Linick, 2011). In the United Kingdom, 
the “Academies Act” of 2010 greatly expanded the role of academies, which are similar to 
charter schools in the United States, and now 1.7 million students attend academies (Tilley, 
2013). Germany promoted choice by allowing parents to choose between schools of various 
religious denomination or non-denominational schools at the primary level and allowing for 
choice among a variety of academic programs at the secondary level (Reuter, 2004). Both Chile 
and Sweden provide substantial vouchers to encourage families to choose whether their children 
attend public or private schools (West, 1997). In addition, the educational systems of Poland, 
Russia, China, Singapore, Japan, Korea, and South Africa contain market-like elements 
(Lubienski, 2009). This non-comprehensive list demonstrates the international push towards 
market-based educational reforms and the significance of developing a clear understanding of 
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how to study such reforms. While understanding the role of competition in driving improvement 
in these settings is important, without a clear definition of competition, and how to measure it, 
educational researchers will struggle to accurately quantify the ways these reforms impact 
students.  
In the United States, there are many forms of school choice: charter schools, private 
schools, magnet schools, vouchers, tuition tax credits, homeschooling, and simply moving one’s 
family to a new school district—typically referred to as Tiebout choice, named for economist 
Charles Tiebout, the process by which residential choices determine the quality of, and level 
spending on, local public goods. Essentially, Tiebout choice demonstrates that people will move 
to localities that tax and spend on local goods at levels that reflect their personal (or familial) 
priorities—in this case public education (Hoxby, 2001). Families that highly prioritize public 
education, and can afford it, will move to higher taxing districts with better public schools, while 
families that do not prioritize public education may live in areas with lower tax rates. Proponents 
of market-based education reforms such as charter schools and vouchers posit that such reforms 
provide families without the financial capital to move to the school district of their choice wi th 
viable alternatives to nearby publicly-run school districts. Indeed, the idea that parents and 
families should have some control over the education of their children is widely embraced, and 
reflected in recent federal policies including No Child Left Behind and Race to the Top 
(Berends, Cannata, & Goldring, 2011). 
Many advocates of school choice policies claim that such policies, in addition to offering 
alternative options, will improve the performance and efficiency of existing public schools by 
exposing them to competitive pressure (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Friedman, 1955; Hess, 2001; 
Hoxby, 2003). Currently, the most popular and quickly growing school choice initiative is the 
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expansion of charter schools (National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2012; Teske et al., 
2001). The assertion that competition, whether created by charter schools or other market-based 
reforms, will improve performance in all schools is widely embraced by advocates and the 
media. For example, Michelle Rhee, former Washington D.C. School Chancellor and now 
author, pundit, and activist has said, “I think the notion that somehow by introducing 
competition, whether through charter schools or vouchers, for low income kids that somehow 
that is going to be a detriment to a system, I actually think that the exact opposite is true” (Jones, 
2011). Also, Mary Sanchez, a reporter and editorial columnist for the Kansas City Star titled an 
article “Charter schools bring competition to education” (Sanchez, 2013). 
The effects of schools of choicei on students attending schools of choice can be referred 
to as the first-level effects of such schools (Lubienski, 2012). The effectiveness of charter 
schools, the first-level effects, have been studied by many scholars and the results of these 
studies vary, which is not surprising considering the different methods used to study these 
schools, the differences between the schools, and the differences in the local and political 
contexts in which the schools exist (Winters, 2012). There is a growing, yet also conflicted, body 
of literature that examines the second-level effects of charter schools—the effect a charter school 
has on the students and schools already in operation near the charter school. Economists have 
predicted (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Friedman, 1955; Hoxby, 2003) that the introduction of 
competition into the educational marketplace will improve educational outcomes for all students; 
such effects can be referred to as the second-level effects of charter schools (Linick, 2012).  
There are many well-executed, rigorous studies of the effects of market-based reforms; 
however, whether these studies are capturing the true effects of competition and not simply the 
effects of choice, autonomy, or policy-specific context is not clear. Although inter-district 
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choice, vouchers, and charter schools are all popular reforms designed to inject competition into 
the educational market place and all of these policies can be examined to learn more about the 
effects of competition on school districts and district-run schools, charter schools have received 
the most attention in recent years from educational researchers. Charter school policies have 
enjoyed vast expansion throughout the United States along with bipartisan support, unlike 
voucher policies. For the purposes of this essay, I will focus on how researchers have examined 
the second-level effects of charter schools. Theoretically, charter schools are expected to drive 
innovation and school reform in a number of ways: by reducing bureaucracy (Chubb and Moe, 
1990), promoting collaborative educational conditions (Fact Sheet: Race to the Top, 2009), and 
improving efficiency in district-run public schools by generating competition. Such competition 
has been demonstrated to improve efficiency in other markets, such as healthcare and trucking 
and parcel service (Hoxby, 2003). 
Despite the growing focus on the second-level effects of charter schools, one of the 
central, yet unresolved, issues in the discussion of charter schools is if competition generated by 
charter schools leads to improved efficiency and performance in district-run public schools (Ni, 
2009). The vast majority of students still attend district-run public schools, and it is likely to 
remain that way for some time (Booker, Gilpatric, Grongerg, & Jansen, 2008; Ni, 2009); so the 
student impact of charter schools is most common through second-level effects. Therefore, “a 
better understanding of the effect of choice (and hence competition) on the behavior of parents 
and school officials is crucial in assessing current reforms…” (Ghosh, 2010 pg. 440). Like 
charter schools themselves, the studies of second-level effects vary greatly by examining 
different contexts and measuring different things. I argue that to quantitatively validate, or 
invalidate, the claims made about the effects of competition on educational organizations, an 
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empirically validated measure of competition must be developed so that studies of the effects of 
competition are reliable and comparable. Further, there must be agreement about the definition 
of competition. Quality syntheses of the second-level effects of charter schools have been 
presented, and contribute greatly to this discussion (Ni, 2009; Ni & Arsen, 2010). The purpose 
here is not to replicate such work, but to build on it and discuss the inconsistent definitions and 
measurements of competition and how such inconsistencies obscure our understanding of the 
actual second-level effects of charter schools by blending multiple concepts under the broad 
definition of “competition.” 
Choice and Competition 
To summarize the existing literature on the second-level effects of charter schools: 
multiple studies, using a variety of methods and various measures of competition in many 
different contexts, have found that charter school competition either improves (Bohte, 2004; 
Booker et al., 2008; Holmes, DeSimone, & Rupp, 2003; Hoxby, 2003; Sass, 2006; Winters, 
2012), impairs (Arsen & Ni, 2012; Bettinger, 2005; Carr & Ritter, 2007; Imberman, 2007; Ni, 
2009), or has no effect on (Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; Buddin & Zimmer, 2005) the performance or 
efficiency of public school districts, district-run public schools, or students attending such 
schools. The inconsistency of findings within and across empirical models does not indicate that 
any particular model is superior, but does emphasize the lack of consensus about how to define 
and measure competition. Even a single study using multiple quasi-experimental models failed to 
find consensus (Imberman, 2007). For a more detailed discussion of the individual methods used 
to investigate the second-level effects of charter schools refer to Appendix A.   
Measures of Competition 
 64 
 
More striking than variation in methods used to measure the second-level effects of 
charter schools is the variation in how competition is measured. While there is little quantitative 
or quasi-experimental research on the effects of charter school policies on district-run public 
schools, there a substantial amount of research examining competition through the lens of charter 
school presence (Bettinger, 2005; Bifulco & Ladd, 2005; Holmes et al., 2003) and the market 
share of charter schools (Arsen & Ni, 2012; Hoxby, 2003; Imberman, 2007; Ni, 2009; Winters, 
2012). Some studies, in an effort to examine competition as comprehensively as possible, have 
used multiple measures (Buddin & Zimmer, 2005; Carr & Ritter, 2007) of competition or 
combined measures (Bohte, 2004; Booker et al., 2008; Sass, 2006). Though there was little 
consistency in findings derived from disparate methods of analysis, one would hope that similar 
measures of competition would result in similar findings, though that is not the case.  
Studies examining competition solely through the lens of proximity and density of nearby 
charter schools have found that the second-level effects of charter schools improve (Holmes et 
al., 2003), impair (Bettinger, 2005), or do not impact district-run public schools (Bifulco & Ladd, 
2005). Likewise, studies examining only the market share of charter schools, as a proxy for 
competition, have found that district-run public schools benefit (Hoxby, 2003; Winters, 2012) 
and are harmed (Arsen & Ni, 2012; Imberman, 2007; Ni, 2009) by the second-level effects of 
charter schools. Buddin and Zimmer (2005) found no effect for any measure of competition, and 
Carr and Ritter (2007) found small, negative effects with every measure used. Additionally, an 
aspect of competition that was not examined in many studies was duration of competition. In 
studies that did employ a measure of duration, Booker et al. (2008) found that sustained 
competition had positive, significant outcomes for district-run public schools, and Arsen and Ni 
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(2012) and Ni (2009) found that sustained competition negatively impacted district-run public 
schools. 
The trend of no consensus ends with studies that examine both the density of charter 
schools in a given area and the market share enjoyed by those charter schools. In all three studies 
measuring competition as a function of both density of charter schools and market share of 
charter schools, charter school competition was found to positively impact the performance of 
district-run public schools (Bohte, 2004; Booker et al., 2008; Sass, 2006). While it is possible 
that studies that proxy competition through market share and market density are capturing a 
different aspect of charter school effects than intended, the findings using this kind of measure 
suggests more consistency than other measures.   
Measures of Choice not Competition 
While many charter school policies create new schools that are meant to generate 
competition with nearby public school districts, they are not necessarily creating competition, 
only choice. Admittedly, any given public school was one of many choices long before charter 
school policies first emerged. Parents have had options of private schools, other public schools, 
or homeschooling. Granted, these choices open the potential for significant costs such as tuition, 
moving to a new district, or the time and energy investment of homeschooling; however, it is not 
clear whether public school districts felt the need to respond competitively or improve practices 
due to the competitive pressure of these forces. Though charter schools require less investment 
on the part of families, until the public school district is threatened by the charter school, it is 
simply generating choice, not competition. Hoxby (2000) demonstrated that more educational 
choices led to increased productivity and efficiency in public schools, but there is no evidence 
that this is caused or not caused by competitive effects.  
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In fact, it can be argued that many studies of “charter school competition” are not actually 
measuring competition. The proximity of nearby charter schools (Holmes et al., 2003), or the 
density of charter schools (Bifulco & Ladd, 2006), is not an indicator of competition, but the 
number of educational options. While choice is often proffered as a proxy for competition, or as 
an ensured creator of competition (Ghosh, 2010), considering the history of conflicting findings, 
there is little evidence that such measures sufficiently capture whether or not charter schools are 
exerting actual competitive pressures on nearby public schools.    
An additional concern, when comparing these studies, is the subject facing the 
competitive pressure of the charter schools. Different measures of competition measure different 
subjects; market share measures may be appropriate for measuring the level of competition felt 
by a district, whereas proximity to a given school, or density around a given school, is more 
appropriate for measuring the effects facing an individual school (Bifulco & Ladd, 2006). 
Considering the original assertion by Friedman (1955) that competition would improve 
efficiency, keeping these different subjects in mind is important. School efficiency at its most 
basic measurement is a function of dollars spent and achievement earned (Hoxby, 2003); 
however, the various measures of competition are more closely associated with different aspects 
of that equation. A district’s response to competition is more likely to be associated with 
movement of financial resources (Arsen & Ni, 2012), while a school’s response through 
instructional changes or variation in teacher/administrator effort is more likely to impact 
achievement. Arguably, an increase in achievement or a decrease in spending will both result in 
efficiency gains, but if future research is going to examine the second-level effects of charter 
schools with any consistency, and a desire to capture the entire effect of competition, measures 
must include both district and school level measures of competitive response. 
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Studies using both market share measures and measures of proximity or density (Bohte, 
2004; Booker et al., 2008; Sass, 2006) fulfill that need, but make up a minority of the existing 
literature. Inasmuch as there is consistency of outcomes across the studies using both density and 
market share measures of competition, the variation across methods of measuring market share 
can further cloud any accumulated understanding of charter school second-level effects. 
Unfortunately, there is even differentiation in the way that market share is measured; some 
studies assume that every student in a charter school has left the district, but many students will 
attend charter schools in a completely different district, thereby further complicating the measure 
of market share (Ni & Arsen, 2010). Additional concerns arise when considering market share as 
a viable measure for competition. First, public school districts, especially urban districts, have 
long split market shares of students with private schools—so any measure of charter competition 
using market share should incorporate previous measures of market sharing or only measure 
students leaving district-run schools for charter schools. Second, measures of market share are 
not sensitive to changes in the school age population. If a percentage of students in a given 
district attending the district-run public school drops from 70% to 64%, the competition 
generated by such a change may be drastically lessened if the total number of school age children 
is growing, just as the generated competition may be drastically increased if the population of 
school age children is dwindling—in either situation market share becomes a less consistent 
proxy for measures of competition.  
Measuring Policy Outcomes, Not Competition 
How charter school policy is written matters, as does how, where, and when it is 
implemented. Charter school advocate Jean Allen said, “If a charter school law isn’t strong, 
school choice options minimal or non-existent, digital learning exists for the few over the many, 
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and teacher quality measures are not assured, students will not have opportunities they need and 
deserve” (Center for Education Reform Press Release, 2013). The press release also asserts that 
strong reforms have only occurred in 13 states. In order to understand how and if charter schools 
impact public school districts and district-run public schools, one must understand the variation 
in charter school policies and regulations. How and if a school or district responds to charter 
school competition may depend greatly on the pressure, or lack of pressure, inherent in charter 
school policiesii (Ni & Arsen, 2010). Though quasi-experimental analyses have been used to 
examine the effects of charter school competition in many states, expecting homogenous results 
from heterogeneous policies is naïve. However, until we understand how and what is measured 
in studies of the second-level effects of charter schools, understanding the potential effects of 
different policies on district-run public schools is impossible.   
 Is the intended outcome of charter school policies competition or improved educational 
outcomes? Arguably, there are many ways in which a charter school or charter school policy can 
induce (or mitigate) change in a public school district, and only one of these avenues is 
competition (Linick & Lubienski, 2013). If a public school even chooses to respond to a nearby 
charter school, the possible responses are not limited to competition and may include 
accommodation, collusion, and cooperation (Ni & Arsen, 2010). Therefore, a policy designed to 
create market-like competition between schools, but results in cooperation between schools, is 
ultimately a failure regardless of educational outcomes. Further, a study of charter school 
competition that results in improved academic outcomes may not be measuring the effect of 
competition at all, but merely interaction. For this reason, the term second-level effect is a much 
more accurate label for the outcomes associated with charter schools and district-run public 
schools.   
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In fact, to assert that the variable of study is competition, and that that variable is causally 
related to academic outcomes at district-run public schools, requires a series of specific 
assumptions to be fulfilled. First, a charter school must open in an area that would provide a 
viable option to parents and students. Second, parents and students must feel as though the 
charter school provides a viable educational option. Third, parents and students must choose to 
attend the charter school. Fourth, the district-run public school must feel that enough students 
have left, or that the charter school provides enough of a threat, that a response is required. Fifth, 
the district-run public school must feel that the way to respond to this threat is by improving 
academic outcomes. Sixth, to see any competitive effects, the district-run public school must 
actually be able to improve academic outcomes. Though it is possible to statistically isolate how 
changes in the educational landscape, such as increasing numbers of charter schools or growing 
market shares of students leaving district schools for charters, are associated with gains in 
academic improvement, it is not possible, solely through the use of quantitative measures, to 
determine whether such changes are due to competitive responses, other interactions between the 
charter and district schools, or other unobserved contextual variables related to the change in the 
educational landscape.  
Indeed, if the intended measure is competition, how can competition be measured 
quantitatively without including other types of interactions between district schools and charter 
schools? Understanding the effect of competition on educational outcomes requires the study of 
competition on educational outcomes; however, current approaches to the study of charter school 
competition are based on a series of assumptions about how charter schools and public schools 
interact. First, the observation that charter school density, proximity, or market share is 
generating competition because of effects, does not account for any effects that could be 
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generated through choice, autonomy, collusion, or cooperation. Second, the assumption that the 
presence of charter schools is inducing a competitive response is flawed as institutional factors 
and environmental factors may prevent a public school district or school from responding 
(Linick & Lubienski, 2013; Ni & Arsen, 2010). Lastly, though many studies claim charter school 
competition is generating effects, a more accurate description would be that charter school 
proximity, density, and/or market share is associated with a change of outcomes at district-run 
schools. As seen in Table 1, institutional factors have the potential to disrupt any measure of 
competition; methodologically, researchers approach these concerns and attempt to compensate 
for them through the use of quasi-experimental models. However, the environmental factors 
below complicate how studies have traditionally approached these measures and should be 
considered in future research.  
Table 14. Factors related to methodological studies of competition.  
 Proximity and Density Market Share 
Institutional Factors Opportunity for collusion or cooperation 
 
Opportunity for collusion or cooperation 
Quality of district school and competing 
charters 
 
Quality of district school and competing charters 
Ability of district to respond to 
competitive cues  
 
Ability of district to respond to competitive cues 
Environmental 
Factors 
Measures of choice not competition Changes in school age population 
 
 Existing splits in market share 
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Given the relative newness of charter schools and the growing literature surrounding their 
effects, it is important that policymakers, scholars, and stakeholders understand what is being 
discussed when examining the second-level effects of charter schools. As stated above, the 
majority of students is currently attending district-run public schools, and will be for the 
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foreseeable future; therefore, the effects of charter schools on the educational landscape will be 
most widely felt through second-level effects. As such, it is important that we begin to develop 
as clear an understanding as possible about outcomes associated with these policies and reforms; 
however, current quantitative research has approached the concept of “competition” from various 
methods, using various measures, and in various contexts.  
It is clear that some researchers (Ghosh, 2010; Hoxby, 2000) argue that choice is 
competition, or at least leads to competition. This definition is too simplistic; arguably, 
competition only exists when choice is coupled with an effort by one or more party to produce 
results superior to other involved parties. Imagine a track on which a single person is running; 
this person is only compelled to run as fast as he wishes. Simply adding runners to the track does 
not create a race; it only creates possible distractions for the original runner. It is not until the 
original runner is compelled to run faster than another runner on the track that competition 
actually exists—though choice is a necessary component of competition, it is not a proxy for 
competition any more than three people jogging independently on a track is a proxy for a race. 
The concept of competition, while relatively new to educational policy, is not new to 
economics. In fact, there are existing measures such as the Herfindahl Index that are used to 
measure the size of agencies in a given industry and measure the competition between them. In 
fact, the Herfindahl Index is used by the US Department of Justice to examine market 
concentration and pursue anti-trust cases (www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hhi.html). As 
seen above, the most consistent findings were generated by studies that examine both the second-
level effects of charter schools on schools and districts by including measures for both market 
share and density in the competition measures—the two measures examined by the Herfindahl 
Index. This index, used to calculate the level of competition in a given educational market could 
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be expressed as ∑   
  
    where   is the proportion of students in a given market that attend 
educational agency i, and N is the number of educational agencies available to a student in the 
market. Changes in the Herfindahl Index would then indicate changes in the level of competition 
in a given market, and duration could easily be added to any measurement of magnitude to 
provide further detail about the effects on a charter school on a public district or school. To date, 
most studies on school competition do not use this accepted measure of competition. 
A disadvantage of this index is the size or scope of the market is not determined by the 
index itself. Indeed, this concern could pose serious issues to analysis and generalizability of 
findings; as noted above, measures of market share that do not account for inter-district transfers 
and competition may fail to fully account for the second-level effects. As measures, such as the 
Herfendahl Index, are explored for use in this field, incorporating what is already known about 
how variations in how competition is measured impacts outcomes associated with such 
measurements is essential. Variations in distance used to measure educational competition led to 
different outcomes, though variations in local policy and context may lead to variations in the 
size of the educational market.  
It is important that the education reforms that tout the use of economic concepts such as 
competition and efficiency as drivers of educational improvement be examined as accurately as 
possible. However, the true impact of these reforms is obscured by inconsistency in 
measurement and definition. Future research must bring clarity to these concepts, and perhaps 
answer other important questions about the potential impacts of market-based reforms. 
Economics can provide helpful insight to the growing literature examining the second-level 
effects of charter schools. Indeed, there are many aspects of the charter school movement that, 
while new to education, have been studied in detail in other fields. What can economics tell 
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educational researchers about the role of local context in studying a competitive marketplace? 
What is the impact of franchising on independent providers? At what point does a market 
become saturated? While respecting the impact of local context on educational outcomes, until 
there is consistency in what is being measured, and how it is being measured, studies of charter 
school competition are likely to continue generating noise but little light. 
                                                 
i
 “Schools of choice” refers to schools that offer alternatives to district-run public schools, these include private 
schools, voucher accepting schools, charter schools, and other district-run public schools in inter-district choice 
schemes.  
ii
 A significant literature examining the role of local context in charter competition has stressed the importance of 
these variables. For a comprehensive review of this topic consult Ni and Arsen (2010).  
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APPENDIX A 
When attempting to examine the causal impact of charter school competition, there are 
two challenges that must be addressed: 1) charter school locations are endogenously chosen, and 
2) students endogenously self-select into charter schools (Ni, 2009). The use of instrument 
variable estimation (IVE) or fixed effects regression address issue one, and to address issue two 
researchers should include past performance, school composition, or account for unobserved 
student heterogeneity (Ni, 2009). Most studies quantitatively examining the second-level effects 
of charter schools employ either fixed effects regression (Imberman, 2007; Ni, 2009;) or IVE 
(Bettinger, 2005; Holmes et al., 2003; Imberman, 2007), though difference-in-difference is used 
as well (Hoxby, 2003). 
In an effort to identify the exogenous second-level effects of charter schools, several 
studies have made use of IVE models. Such models, in an effort to carve out the exogenous 
impact of the competition rely on an instrument variable (Murnane & Willett, 2011), in this case 
a variable that is related to the location of the charter but not related to student performance. 
While this method is helpful for examining causal effects without establishing a random control 
trial, different data and contexts require some creativity on the creation of the instrument 
variable. One study used the distance from the district-run public school to nearest charter 
authorizing university as the instrument variable (Bettinger, 2005); another study used the 
number of available spaces, or “building stock” for charters to locate as the instrument variable 
(Imberman, 2007). The use of IVE models have not resulted in consistent findings across studies, 
some studies have demonstrated that district-run public schools near charter schools perform 
worse than similar schools not near charter schools (Bettinger, 2005; Imberman, 2007), and 
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another has shown that the second-level effects of charter schools improved district-run public 
school performance (Holmes, DeSimone, & Rupp, 2003).      
Accounting for student and school fixed effects is another popular method scholars 
employ in an effort to examine the exogenous second-level effects of charter schools. Fixed 
effects control for the variation within observed units, in this case within student performance 
across time and within schools. In addition to including student and school fixed effects, some 
studies have also included “spell effects” which are time invariant student and school factors 
(Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; Booker et al., 2008; Sass, 2006; Winters, 2012). Scholars argue that by 
accounting for these factors in the analysis studies are accounting for any observed variable bias 
that may endogenously impact the second-level effects of charter schools, and are therefore 
reporting unbiased results. Like IVE models, fixed effects models have not resulted in consistent 
findings across studies; some studies have found that the second-level effects of charter schools 
negatively impacted district-run public schools (Arsen & Ni, 2012; Ni, 2009;), while other 
studies using fixed effects have found that the second-level effects of charter schools have 
benefitted district-run public schools (Booker et al., 2008; Sass, 2006; Winters, 2012). Some 
studies have found that the second-level effects of charter schools do not impact district-run 
public schools at all (Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; Buddin & Zimmer, 2005). 
 
